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Data Management Law for the 2020s:
The Lost Origins and the New Needs
PRZEMYSŁAW PAŁKA†
In the data analytics society, each individual’s disclosure of
personal information imposes costs on others. This disclosure
enables companies, deploying novel forms of data analytics, to infer
new knowledge about other people and to use this knowledge to
engage in potentially harmful activities. These harms go beyond
privacy and include difficult to detect price discrimination,
preference manipulation, and even social exclusion. Currently
existing, individual-focused, data protection regimes leave law
unable to account for these social costs or to manage them.
This Article suggests a way out, by proposing to re-conceptualize
the problem of social costs of data analytics through the new frame
of “data management law.” It offers a critical comparison of the two
existing models of data governance: the American “notice and
choice” approach and the European “personal data protection”
regime (currently expressed in the General Data Protection
Regulation). Tracing their origin to a single report issued in 1973,
the Article demonstrates how they developed differently under the
influence of different ideologies (market-centered liberalism, and
human rights, respectively). It also shows how both ultimately
failed at addressing the challenges outlined already forty-five years
ago.
To tackle these challenges, this Article argues for three
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normative shifts. First, it proposes to go beyond “privacy” and
towards “social costs of data management” as the framework for
conceptualizing and mitigating negative effects of corporations’
data usage. Second, it argues to go beyond the individual interests,
to account for collective ones, and to replace contracts with
regulation as the means of creating norms governing data
management. Third, it argues that the nature of the decisions about
these norms is political, and so political means, in place of
technocratic solutions, need to be employed.
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INTRODUCTION
In the data analytics society,1 a person who allows a
company to collect data about herself enables that company
to indirectly learn things about other people.2 Some of this
inferred knowledge might pertain to private matters, which
the other prefers to keep unknown. However, even
knowledge inferred about non-private matters, which people
might freely disclose, can be costly when captured in the vast
databases of online companies. Non-private information can
be used to engage in fine-tuned price discrimination,3 to
harness behavioral effects like preference manipulation4 or
addiction,5 or to sustain social segmentation, subordination,
and even exclusion.6 These costs, conceptually distinct from
the problem of “privacy,”7 are unaccounted for by
contemporary privacy law, in particular the “notice and
choice” model governing consumer data collection and
usage.8 When I allow others to collect data about me, I

1. By “data analytics society,” I mean the socio-technological reality where a
significant number of individuals’ daily activities is mediated by technology,
recorded in tech companies’ databases, and analyzed in order to refine the
environment, including via personalized communications. See infra Section II.A.
2. See infra Section II.A.
3. See Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination: When Demand Is a
Function of Both Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 254
(2019).
4. See Eliza Mik, The Erosion of Autonomy in Online Consumer
Transactions, 8 L., INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 1 (2016); see also infra Section II.B.
5. See Jack Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain 4 (Hoover Working
Grp. on Nat’l Sec., Tech., & Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814, 2018) (“The more
digital companies know about people’s emotional vulnerabilities and
predispositions, the more easily they can structure individual end-user
experience to addict end users to the site”); see also infra Section II.B.
6. See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, QUEUE,
Mar. 2013, at 10-16, https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2460278; see also
Muhammad Ali et al., Discrimination through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad
Delivery Can Lead to Skewed Outcomes, PROG. ACM HUM.-COMPUTER
INTERACTION, Nov. 2019, at 2–4, https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3359301.
7. See infra Section II.C.
8. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
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impose various costs on you and our fellow humans. My
consent, even well-informed, cannot justify the costs imposed
on others.
This state of affairs is caused both by the changes in
socio-technological practice and by the law. Widespread
usage of internet-connected smart devices allows service
providers to continuously collect data about millions of
people.9 Data analytics techniques, like machine learning,
enable companies to detect patterns in the enormous
databases and to infer new knowledge from them.10 People’s
reliance on online communications makes it possible for
companies to act upon that knowledge through automated,
personalized communications.11 As a result, the music you
listen to on Spotify can reveal your race,12 and influence what
job advertisements you will receive through Google Ads.13
The type of food you order on Uber Eats can reveal your
political convictions14 and be used to encourage or discourage
you from voting through the content you see on Facebook.15
Whose posts you like on Twitter can help reveal how rich you
are16 and enable online sellers to price-discriminate against

785–918 (2018); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014); see also infra Section
III.A.
9. See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 9–10 (2016).
10. Id. at 10–19.
11. Id. at 125–39.
12. Shantal R. Marshall & Laura P. Naumann, What’s Your Favorite Music?
Music Preferences Cue Racial Identity, 76 J. RES. PERSONALITY 74, 74 (2018).
13. For the empirical evidence of racial discrimination in online ad-delivery,
see Sweeney, supra note 6.
14. See Daniel DellaPosta et al., Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?, 120 AM. J.
SOC. 1473, 1474–75 (2015).
15. See Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone
Ever Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/
117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering.
16. See Yannick Leo et al., Socioeconomic Correlations and Stratification in
Social-Communication Networks, 13 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE 1, 1 (2016).
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you.17 All these things are possible not because you directly
disclose information about your race, political convictions,
and wealth. Rather, the bits and pieces you disclose,
analyzed in the context of data about millions of others, allow
the data holders to infer these facts about you.18
Law plays a significant, even if background, role in the
creation of this world. Technology, and the way people use it,
renders the practices described above factually possible; but
it is the law that deems them normatively permissible. As of
today, companies derive their rights to collect, analyze, and
use the personal data from the individual users’ “choices” or
“consents.”19 In their “privacy policies,” online service
providers inform us what they plan to do with the data they
collect, and we grant them to a right to do so. However, it is
by no means obvious that it should be up to the individual to
make these decisions or grant these permissions. Not only
the consequences of accepting a policy are often unknown to
the users,20 but also the effects of the data-driven actions
might affect people who are not even parties to the
agreement that accepting the privacy policy creates.
For these reasons, an individual consumer is neither
cognitively capable nor normatively competent to “agree” to
data collection and usage that will affect not only her but also
other individuals and indeed society as a whole. And yet, the
currently dominant “notice and choice” paradigm of
American consumer privacy law is based precisely on the
paradigm of individual consent.21 With a few exceptions, no

17. Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1386–87 (2017).
18. To be clear, this is not “knowledge” in the philosophical sense, but rather
what Ethem Alpaydin calls “a good and useful approximation.” ALPAYDIN, supra
note 9, at 13.
19. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 592.
20. Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet:
Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking
Services, 21 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 128, 143 (2018).
21. See infra Section III.A.
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federal rules setting absolute substantive limits on the types
of usage of personal data exist.22 By refraining from stepping
in, the law creates certain markets and incentives to
construct business models around obtaining consent to
effectively unrestricted data collection, analysis, and
usage.23
This Article proposes to address the problem of social
costs of data gathering, analysis and usage within a new
legal frame: “data management law.” This proposed
reconceptualization aims to create a new legal field and
includes not just a call to enact new rules but also to
reconsider existing rules within a different paradigm. “Data
management law” would encompass both the existing and
the future norms stipulating who is entitled to do what with
which personal information and under what conditions. For
this paradigm shift to occur, the law must reform along three
dimensions.
First, the legal community needs to go beyond “privacy”
when pondering harms of data analytics, and move towards
a more inclusive category of “social costs of data
management.”24 Various types of data-driven social costs
exist; many of them have little to do with disclosure of
personal
data.
For
example,
data-driven
price
discrimination, preference manipulation, or social
segmentation can hurt individuals that remain anonymous
from the point of view of the company conducting such
actions.25 As a result, the privacy protections applying to

22. See infra Section I.C.
23. See Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power, in INFORMATION, FREEDOM
PROPERTY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Bibi van den Berg eds., 2016); see also JULIE. E. COHEN,
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL
CAPITALISM (2019).
AND

24. For the explanation of the concept of a social cost, see Ronald H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 837 (1960).
25. See infra Section II.B.1.
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“identified or identifiable”26 persons might not be triggered
in situations most harmful to society and individuals. Not
everything done with personal data should be governed
solely by privacy laws.
Second, we need to go beyond the individual interests
and account also for the collective ones. Matters like nondiscrimination, the integrity of the political process, or
mental health, should not be the domain of individual
preferences. They are of interest to the society as a whole. In
the data analytics society, they are endangered. Instead of
relying on individual consumers to consult the privacy
policies, and to decide whether they accept the rules or not,
we need public-oriented disclosures (“societal notice”) and
collectively taken decisions (“societal choices”). This will
mean separating the fact-conferring function currently
played by corporations’ privacy policies from the normcreating one and supplementing contracts with regulation.27
Third, the policy-makers need to abandon the
technocratic normative standards and replace them with
politics. The rules governing data management should not
come from the market,28 as they currently do in the US, or be
derived from general principles like human rights29 or
“fiduciary duties.”30 Rather, they should be decided through
public deliberations, based on reliable knowledge (coming
from societal notices) and considering various interests at

26. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814,
1818–19 (2011).
27. See infra Part IV.
28. For the proposal of managing external effects of data analytics using
economic solutions, like the “Pigouvian taxes,” see Omri Ben-Shahar, Data
Pollution (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 854, 2018).
29. See infra Section III.B.2.
30. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1233 (2016). But see Lina Khan & David Pozen, A
Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 509–10 (2019).
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stake. These decisions, given the enormous variety of uses of
personal data, and the heterogeneity of risks imposed by
them, should not come in the form of “one-size-fits-all”
regulation, as they currently do both in the US and the EU.
Rather, they should occur on a sectoral, issue-by-issue
basis.31
My argument is based on the lessons learned from the
critical analysis of the development of the “data management
law” in the United States, and its comparison with the
alternative approach adopted by the European Union,
currently expressed in the EU General Data Protection
Regulation.32 I provide a new history of both legal regimes
seen together, tracing the origins of both models to a single
document, namely the 1973 Report of the U.S. Health,
Education and Welfare Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Automated Personal Data Systems titled Records,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens.33 Its influence on the
American law is acknowledged,34 though as I show, often
misunderstood. Regarding the European system, this article
nuances the self-understanding of European data protection
lawyers by demonstrating how the GDPR’s regulatory
framework can be traced back to a document issued by
Americans for the American administration.35

31. See infra Section IV.C.
32. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119)
[hereinafter GDPR].
33. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973) [hereinafter 1973 REPORT].
34. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP
IT 201 (2008); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 36; Marc Rotenberg, Fair
Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get),
2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13–17, 15 n.74.
35. See infra Section I.C.
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This document turns out to have been not only
influential but also prescient. I show that, already in the
early 1970s, certain problems we tend to treat as new were
foreseen. These include the ease of combining data from
different sources and using it for unintended purposes,
organizations’ ability to use this data to influence the
behavior of individuals, the possibility of masking policydecisions as technical ones, and the risk of imposing the costs
on the most vulnerable members of the society.36 The report’s
authors foresaw the need to closely monitor technological
developments, and to take regulatory decisions regarding the
limits of automated data analytics.37 The recommendations
they put forward called for legislative intervention, enabling
public oversight over the organizations’ data practices. The
proposed legislation, based on three pillars: general
principles, public-oriented disclosure, and data subjects’
rights; was supposed to facilitate political deliberations
about the acceptable frames for data management.38
However, neither the American nor the European data
management frameworks managed to fulfill the tasks the
report set forth. Today, we suffer the consequences of these
failures.
I trace how the existing American approach has been
developed within the 1990s mindset favoring the markets,
self-regulation and individual choice, thereby ignoring the
questions of externalities, and opposing regulation. The
European model, on the other hand, was forged largely by
human rights lawyers, first and foremost concentrating on
keeping the state power in check, thereby ignoring the
reality of market operations. On the surface, the two regimes
seem distinct.39 The American law is sectorial, market36. See infra Section I.A.
37. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 12–30.
38. Id. at 48–71.
39. For the comparisons of both systems, see Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in
Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries,
42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2019); Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus
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oriented and based on self-regulation, while the European is
general,40 rooted in the human rights logic, and enshrined in
legislation. However, they both commit the same mistakes:
frame the costs of data management solely as the problems
of privacy (or personal data “protection”), concentrate only on
the individual interests, and employ technocratic means of
dealing with these costs (market solutions, and human
rights, respectively). Both the American and European law
forgot the insights provided already forty-five years ago. This
Article serves not only as a reminder, but also updates the
recommendations, to make them directly useful for the sociotechnological reality of the 2020s.
The Article consists of four parts. Part I analyzes the
1973 Report in detail, paying attention to the types of risks
that its authors noticed 45 years ago, as well as the exact
recommendations they made. Part II fast-forwards to 2020,
and focuses on the features of today’s data analytics society,
explaining how three phenomena: (i) seamless data
collection; (ii) inferred knowledge; and (iii) automated
decision making further facilitate practices in which
companies impose costs on individuals and the society as a
whole. I study three examples of such data-driven, costly
behavior: price discrimination, behavior manipulation, and
societal segmentation. Part III analyzes how these practices
are sanctioned by law. It describes the American “notice and
choice” and European “data protection” models of data
management law, tracing their historical and ideological
origins, and pointing out their shortcomings regarding the
management of social costs of data analytics. Part IV draws
lessons from these reconstructions and proposes a way of
thinking about “data management law” for the 2020s. It
argues for: i) moving beyond “privacy” law and towards a
more inclusive category of “social costs of data management”;
ii) accounting for collective interests in addition to individual
Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 180 (2017).
40. Sometimes called “omnibus.” See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at
1141.
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ones; and iii) replacing technocratic means of decisionmaking with politics. Conclusions follow.
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I. THE ORIGINS. OR, HOW THE AMERICANS
“INVENTED” THE GDPR IN 1973
On June 25, 1973, Willis H. Ware sent a letter to a
Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare in the Nixon administration. Ware, a pioneer in
the fields of computing and computer security,41 served as a
chairman of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Automated Personal Data Systems. The Committee had
been formed to analyze the “harmful consequences that may
result from using automated personal data systems.”42 In the
early 70s public and private organizations were rapidly
adopting computers as a technology allowing for more
efficient storage and processing of records about people. In
the midst of the Cold War and the Space Race, the citizens
voiced numerous fears connected with this phenomenon, and
the Government decided to investigate.43
The Committee, comprised of twenty-five members,
including lawyers and engineers, as well as social workers,
managers, state legislators, private citizens, and a labor
union official met nine times between April 1972 and March
1973.44 It heard testimony from more than 100 witnesses,
consulted similar groups from Canada, Great Britain, and
Sweden, and contacted about 250 trade and professional
associations and public interest groups to gather
information. The result of its work, which Ware attached to
his letter to Weinberger, was a 300-page long report, titled
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens.
This report would prove immensely consequential in the
decades to come. It has influenced, though in different,

41. Michael Rich, Eulogy for Willis Ware, RAND (Mar. 28, 2014),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP700/CP775/RA
ND_CP775.pdf.
42. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at ix.
43. See ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY
465-86 (1972); see also Solove & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 36.
44. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 147–59.
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unobvious, and today sometimes forgotten ways, both
American data management law45 and its European
counterpart.46 The vocabulary it used, concepts it coined, and
axiology it proposed continue to shape the laws of today.
However, as I argue in this Article, both the American and
the European data management frameworks did not meet
the report’s challenges. Instead, each regime has been
distorted in various ways and failed to follow-through on
certain foundational tasks. To understand how and why, let
us first take a closer look at this magnificent document.
A. The Rise of the Machine and the Mindset Forty-Five
Years Ago

The Report’s authors stated in the Foreword:
It is important to be aware, as we embrace this new technology, that
the computer, like the automobile, the skyscraper, and the jet
airplane, may have some consequences for American society that
we would prefer not to have thrust upon us without warning. Not
the least of these is the danger that some recordkeeping
applications of computers will appear in retrospect to have been
oversimplified solutions to complex problems, and that their victims
will be some of our most disadvantaged citizens. 47

Today’s debates about fairness of algorithmic practices
regarding
policing,48
creditworthiness,49
teacher’s
assessments,50 or hiring51 render these predictions, made in
45. See infra Section III.A.1.
46. See infra Section III.B.
47. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at v–vi.
48. See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion:
Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2016);
Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109
(2017).
49. See Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big
Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 157 (2016).
50. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3–6 (2016).
51. See McKenzie Raub, Bots, Bias and Big Data: Artificial Intelligence,
Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices, 71 ARK. L.
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the early 1970s, sadly correct. Various “algorithmic tools” put
to work with the aim of optimizing assessment processes
indeed oversimplify the world, and the victims of these
oversimplifications are disproportionately women and racial
minorities.52 Moreover, ironically, in retrospect, we see that
the legal frameworks developed as responses to the
emergence of computing were in themselves simplified
solutions to the complex social problems. The authors begin
by situating the development of computers in a wider social
and historical context, then explain what new capacities
result from their introduction, highlight the risks associated
with these changes, and gradually move to their own policy
proposals. Let us briefly look at each of these.
Three consequences of computers’ introduction and
widespread adoptions attracted the authors’ attention: (i)
substantial enlargement of organizations’ data processing
capacities; (ii) easy access to data within the organization
and across firm boundaries; and (iii) emergence of a “new
class of record keepers.”53 Each of these changes, inherent in
the process of computerization, can be beneficial for an
organization and its clients, but also comes with its own
“latent effects.”54
First, increased data processing capacity might lead to
“too much data” to process. Data overload could force
organizations to try to simplify the world, by creating various
categories ex ante and forcing individuals to “fit [themselves]
into” these categories while filling in the forms and providing
information.55 Second, “easy access” to information within
and across the organizations might lead to combining of
information from various sources, gathered for different
REV. 529 (2018).
52. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016); Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for
Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67 (2017).
53. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 12.
54. Id. at 12–30.
55. Id. at 14.
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purposes, into single individual dossiers. As a result,
“neither the data subject nor the new holder knows what
purpose the data may someday serve.”56 Third, entrusting
more and more data processing into hands of engineers and
system developers might lead to a situation where “questions
of record-keeping practice which involve issues of social
policy are sometimes treated as if they were nothing more
than questions of efficient technique.”57
These three developments are particularly problematic,
in the view of the Report’s authors, when the organizations’
purpose is not only to predict, but also to “coerce” (or, as we
would say nowadays, when such practices became
normalized, “influence” or “nudge”)58 some types of behavior.
They write:
[W]ords like “control” and “coercion” may have an objectionable
ring, but the coercive potential of the surveillance component,
especially in some other area of application, is evident.59

The authors of the 1973 report were aware of the fact
that, as a society, we face policy trade-offs. They enlist
examples of political decisions to be made:
Should a national credit-card service be prohibited from using a
sophisticated personal data system to prevent its card holders from
going on irresponsible spending sprees? Should school districts be
forbidden to use personal data systems to help prevent children
from becoming delinquents? These are difficult questions to
answer.60

56. Id. at 21.
57. Id. at 23.
58. See RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 53–55 (2008). But see SHOSHANA ZUBOFF,
THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE
NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 293–328 (2019).
59. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 26.
60. Id. at 27.
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They immediately indicate why these decisions will be
difficult not only policy-wise (agreeing on values and goals),
but also in regard to the knowledge necessary to make them:
Often the immediate costs of not using systems to take preemptive
action against individuals can be estimated (in both dollars and
predictable social disruption), while the long-term costs of
increasing the capacity of organizations to anticipate, and thus to
control, the behavior of individuals can be discussed only
speculatively.61

The Report’s authors knew that automated personal
data processing, even if conducted for noble purposes,
increases the potential for coercing individual behavior by
private and public organizations. They acknowledged that
this “coercion” might sometimes be socially desirable, but
they claimed that a political decision about whether to allow
it or not, might be difficult to make if the processes are
secret,62 policy decisions are framed as technical ones, and
data gathered for the originally accepted purpose is
combined with other data, and used for some other purpose
later on. In other words, they acknowledged that in order to
take some policy decisions on a societal level, what is
necessary is to establish mechanisms for bringing these
questions to the fore, both concerning those tradeoffs we face
already, as well as questions concerning the future “longterm costs of increasing the capacity of organizations to
anticipate, and thus to control, the behavior of individuals.”63
Interestingly, the authors directed their attention to the
question of “privacy” only after they discussed all these other
concerns. Following the claims made in the literature of their
times,64 they argued that the concept of “privacy” must be
61. Id. at 27–28.
62. Id. at 28–29 (“Today it is much easier for computer-based record keeping
to affect people than for people to affect computer-based record keeping.”).
63. Id. at 28.
64. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. OF
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1967);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968).
THE EXEC.
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refined and expanded. They stated that in the era of
automated personal data processing “an individual’s
personal privacy is directly affected by the kind of disclosure
and use made of identifiable information about him in a
record.”65 The “and use” part is absolutely crucial here. It
suggests that the meaning assigned to the term “privacy”
was expanded in the Report to other individual interests of
persons, qualitatively different from the “disclosure” actions
which were traditionally associated with “privacy” in the
canonical Warren and Brandeis article,66 as well as the
typical formulations of the privacy torts.67
One should notice that this conceptual move was not
inevitable. Arguably, an individual’s view on her personal
information being disclosed to others, and the use to which
this information is put, need not be strongly correlated. For
example, I might strongly prefer that no one learns about the
“guilty pleasure” music I listen to on Spotify but
simultaneously welcome algorithmic suggestions of similar
songs. Or, conversely, I might be fine with everybody
knowing what my religious convictions are, but would
strongly prefer that this information was not used in the
process of assessing my creditworthiness, during the hiring
process, or for directing political communications at me.
These two “dimensions” of privacy: disclosure and usage of
information about a person, can be treated jointly (as the
authors did) or separately, as I argue would be beneficial.68
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that when making

65. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 40–41 (emphasis added).
66. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 204 (1890).
67. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)
(enumerating four types of privacy torts: “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 2. Public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 3. Publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”).
68. See infra Section IV.A.
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recommendations about “privacy,” the Report’s authors
treated these dimensions jointly.
Within this frame, the authors of the 1973 Report
expressed their normative view that: “personal privacy, as it
relates to personal-data record keeping, must be understood
in terms of a concept of mutuality.”69 Since individuals and
organizations often have different though legitimate
interests, the role of law is not to endow any of them with the
unilateral choice of the ways in which data will be used, nor
is it to make the choice regardless of the parties’
preferences.70 Rather, the law should create conditions for a
process through which all the interested parties will be able
to voice their concerns.71
What were these conditions supposed to be?
B. Recommendations
Deliberations

Made:

Legislate

to

Create

Public

The Report divided its recommendations into several
parts, but from this Article’s perspective two are significant:
“Safeguards for Privacy” (Chapter III) and “Recommended
Safeguards for Administrative Personal Data Systems”
(Chapter IV).72 The former contained what came to be known
as “Fair Information Practice Principles,” later picked up and
adopted (in a morphed manner) in the U.S. “notice and
choice” model.73 The latter laid the ground for the axiological
and conceptual framework which, through the 1980 OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data,74 the 1981 Council of Europe
69. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 40.
70. Id. at 43–44.
71. Id.
72. These were followed by specific questions concerning statistical and
research data analysis, usage of Social Security Numbers as universal identifiers,
and other more technical questions, in Chapters V–IX.
73. See infra Section III.A.
74. Ministerial Council of the Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev.,
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Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data,75 and the 1995 EU
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
such Data76 made their way to the GDPR.77 Importantly,
however, the authors of the Report saw both parts as
elements of the same response. Since “privacy,” in their
understanding, encompassed entitlements to participate in
deciding about how personal data will be used, both the
general principles and the specific frame turning them into
concrete practice were designed as parts of the same system.
The general frame of the proposal was based on five “Fair
Information Practices Principles”:
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose
very existence is secret.
2. There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
3. There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without his consent.
4. There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of

Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C(80)58/FINAL
(Sept. 23, 1980) [hereinafter 1980 OECD Guidelines], https://www.oecd.org/
internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowso
fpersonaldata.htm.
75. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108
[hereinafter Convention 108], https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/rms/0900001680078b37.
76. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, O.J. (L 281) 31
[hereinafter 1995 Directive].
77. See infra Section I.C.

580

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the data for their intended use and must take reasonable
precautions to prevent misuse of the data. 78

These principles expressed the general axiology of the
Report’s authors’ argument: transparency, mutuality and
the procedural nature of the regulatory frame. To turn these
principles into social reality, the authors suggested:
The enactment of legislation establishing a Code of Fair
Information Practice for all Automated personal data systems . . .
[providing for] both civil and criminal penalties . . . injunctions . . .
right to bring suits for unfair information practices to recover
actual, liquidated, and punitive damages, in individual or class
actions.79

They expressly argued against self-regulatory
approaches, pointing out that the companies might not have
sufficient incentives to self-regulate.80 The foreseen
legislation, applicable to both private and public
organizations, would divide safeguards applicable to every
data management system into three parts: (i) “General
Requirements”; (ii) “Public Notice Requirement”; and (iii)
“Rights of Individual Data Subjects.”81
“General Requirements,” among others, stipulated:
prohibition of data transfers to other organizations without
the explicit consent of the data subject, and mandatory
requirements for the systems’ security and personnel’s
training.82 The former is extremely important, as this is one
of the major divergence points between the US and the EU.
In the American model, an acceptance of the privacy policy
containing a blank right to transfer to “business partners”
renders such transfers lawful, while in the EU each transfer
should be separately “legalized,” for example through an

78. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 41.
79. Id. at 50.
80. Id. at 52.
81. Id. at 53–64.
82. Id. at 53–55.
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informed consent; and notified every time it occurs.83 The
latter remained present in the data management regimes in
the US and the EU, playing a significant role in the GDPR’s
framework.84
The “Public Notice Requirement” stipulated that every
organization processing data in automated manner shall
make publicly available the information on, among others:
“the nature and purpose(s) of the system”; “the categories
and number of persons on whom data are (to be)
maintained”; “the categories of data (to be) maintained”; “the
organization’s policies and practices regarding data storage,
duration of retention of data, and disposal thereof”; “the
categories of data sources; a description of all types of use (to
be) made of data.”85 This recommendation would later lead
to the idea of “privacy policies,” i.e. documents serving as
vehicles of “notice” for consumers in the American model;
and the transparency requirements in the European model.86
However, in the view of the authors, the role played by the
public notice was supposed to be fact-conferring, not normcreating. Note that within this view, the “public notice” was
not supposed to be a contract. Rather, it was meant to serve
a purpose equivalent to the “nutrition facts” table on food
products. Companies would be liable for misleading the
public, but a person’s “agreement” was not necessarily to be
equated with granting the company a right to engage in
these practices. The norms stipulating what data can be used
for were to be enshrined elsewhere, in sectorial legislation.
Finally, every person about whom data is automatically
processed was to be endowed, by legislation, with a set of
mandatory rights. To realize these rights, every organization
processing personal data was supposed to, among others:
enable an individual to know whether he or she is the subject
83. See GDPR, supra note 32, arts. 6, 12, 14.
84. See id. arts. 32–34.
85. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 57–58.
86. See GDPR, supra note 32, arts. 12–14.
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of data in the system; assure that no use of individually
identifiable data is made that is not within the stated
purposes of the system; inform an individual, upon his or her
request, about the uses made of data about them, and about
the identity of all persons and organizations involved;
maintain procedures that allow an individual who is the
subject of data in the system to contest their accuracy
completeness, pertinence, and the necessity for retaining
them; and permit data to be corrected or amended when the
individual to whom they pertain so requests.87 “Data subjects
rights,” though absent in the “notice and choice” model of
American data management law, became one of the
cornerstones of the European model. The (in)famous “right
to be forgotten”88 can be directly traced back to the 1973 idea
that a person should have a right to “contest necessity for
retaining a piece of data.” Arguably, this part became the
source of the “individualist bias” in the further development
of the American and European regimes.89
Importantly, all three elements: general rules, public
notice, and individual rights were intended to give substance
to the Fair Information Practice Principles. In the Report
authors’ view, such a legal frame was most likely to create
the conditions for public deliberations on the limits of
personal data processing. The intended effects of the
enactment of the Code of Fair Information Practice were
described as follows:
The proposed safeguards are intended to assure that decisions
about collecting, recording, storing, disseminating, and using
identifiable personal data will be made with full consciousness and
87. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 59–63.
88. For a legal-theoretical discussion of the right to be forgotten, see Giovanni
Sartor, The Right to Be Forgotten: Balancing Interests in the Flux of Time, 24
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 72 (2016). For a policy analysis from the domestic
perspective, see Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2017); Daniel Lyons, Assessing the Right to Be Forgotten,
59 BOS. BAR J. 26, 28 (2015); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten,
64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 92 (2012).
89. See infra Section IV.B.
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consideration of issues of personal privacy—issues that arise from
inherent conflicts and contradictions in values and interests. Our
recommended safeguards cannot assure resolution of those conflicts
to the satisfaction of all individuals and groups involved. However,
they can assure that those conflicts will be fully recognized and that
the decision-making processes in both the private and public
sectors, which lead to assigning higher priority to one interest than
to another, will be open, informed, and fair.90

In other words, the authors saw the role of the proposed
legislation not as the ultimate answer to the question of what
practices should be allowed and what not. They understood
that such legislation is necessary to create a forum where, in
the societal and political processes, further decisions about
particular uses will be made. They were also aware that no
one-size-fits-all solution is feasible.91 Even though they do
not use the word, the authors were aware of the possibility
of externalities, and the need to regulate in order to mitigate
them:
The past two decades have given America intensive lessons in the
difficulty of trying to check or compensate for undesirable sideeffects stemming from headlong application and exploitation of
complex technologies. Water pollution, air pollution, the annual
highway death toll, suburban sprawl, and urban decay are all
unanticipated consequences of the too narrowly conceived and
largely unconstrained applications of technology.92

All this taken together: the plea for public disclosure, for
deliberation and for balancing interests—uttered by people
who, in principle, saw development of computers as a
positive phenomenon—signals the authors’ hope that the
enactment of the Code of Fair Information Practice by the
U.S. Congress would have been just the first step. They did
not explicitly outline how they hoped the further
deliberations would look like. Nevertheless, we know that
the problems they foresaw included the rise of uncontrolled
power to coerce behavior, the emergence of engineers being
90. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 43–44.
91. Id. at 43.
92. Id. at 45.
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de facto policymakers, and negative effects affecting the most
vulnerable people. To remedy them, they wanted to install
procedural guarantees providing for societal control and,
potentially, further regulation of particular sectors.
What followed was a much more limited intervention.
C. What Followed: The Transatlantic Split and the
Technocratic Turn
The most direct and immediate effect of the Report’s
publication was the enactment of the 1974 Privacy Act.93
This legislation closely mirrored the recommendations of the
Report. Several substantive rules were put in place,
including the purpose limitation principle, and the citizens
were granted various rights, among others to access and
correct their personal data.94 Nevertheless, the Privacy Act
applied (and applies) only to the Federal Agencies.95 General
in its material scope (as a matter of a rule, it governs all the
personal data gathered by the federal agencies about citizens
for all the purposes), Privacy Act remained limited in its
subjective scope of application, governing just one part of
only the public sector.
Several other statutes followed. Importantly, the
approach taken by the legislature has from the beginning
been sectoral. The legislative acts adopted by Congress
included: Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974,96 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,97 Video

93. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)).
94. See ARTHUR A. BUSHKIN & SAMUEL I. SCHAEN, THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: A
REFERENCE MANUAL FOR COMPLIANCE 7 (1976).
95. Id. at 11–13.
96. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)).
97. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012)).
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Privacy Protection Act of 1988,98 Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 199199 and many others.100
The sectoral, “issue by issue” approach remains the
defining feature of the American data management law. In
itself, this approach has been faithful to the 1973 Report, in
which the authors argued against one, top-down solution to
all possible negative effects of data processing.101 However,
the condition for making sure that the “issue by issue”
approach would be, in the authors’ view, “open, informed,
and fair”102 has never been fully realized. Within this legal
framework, defined by the sectoral approach and lack of
general data transparency, the “notice and choice” paradigm
would be born in the 1990s, influenced however by different
ideologies and tacit normativities. The Report would be cited
and referred to, though as we will see, the ultimate shape of
the end product would look little like the original idea. The
addressee of the disclosure would change from the public to
the individual, requirements about its concreteness would be
watered down, and the free market would be treated as
choice making mechanism superior to politics and
regulation. As a result, since the late 1990s, essentially no
new federal legislation governing data collection and usage
has been enacted. New types of costs created by the business
models of Google, Facebook and Amazon were not followed
by new sectoral legislative interventions. The Report called
for collective decision-making mechanisms, in essence
political. The law of today leaves the decisions to the
individuals and is in essence market-based.

98. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711 (2012)).
99. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)).
100. For the list of the acts adopted as a response to the emergence of internet,
see infra p. 53. For the list of all privacy acts adopted in the United States, see
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 36–39.
101. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 42–43.
102. Id. at 44.
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In Europe, the story took a different path. In 1980 the
OECD Guidelines103 were published, and in 1981 the Council
of Europe’s Convention 108 would follow.104 This Convention
would closely mirror both the vocabulary of the Report
(“personal data,” “data subject,” “processing”) and its general
axiology (public notice, purpose limitation principle, need for
regulation). However, it would do so as a part of its mandate
to protect the human right to privacy.105 It would oblige the
Member States to enact legislation on personal data
“protection”; a general law applicable to both private and
public sectors. National laws enacted to fulfill these
obligations would be further harmonized in 1995 via the
European Union Directive106 and unified and modernized in
2016 with the GDPR.107 In the meantime, the European
Union would declare “personal data protection” a
fundamental right, essentially equivalent to the position
enjoyed in the US by the Bill of Rights.108
The European regimes would closely follow the
recommendation of the 1973 report, by operating within the
frame of (i) general principles; (ii) public notice; (iii) subjects
rights.109 However, since the body through which the
legislation would be adopted would be the Council of Europe,
an international organization created to protect human
rights, the reception of the idea would be conducted within
the “privacy is a human right” ideology. This, taken together
with the “direct effect doctrine”110 would largely influence the
103. 1980 OECD Guidelines, supra note 74.
104. Convention 108, supra note 75.
105. See infra Section III.B.1.
106. 1995 Directive, supra note 76.
107. GDPR, supra note 32.
108. See generally GLORIA GONZALEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE
DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU (2014).

OF

PERSONAL

109. See infra Section III.B.1.
110. Broadly speaking, in the European Union law, unlike in the United
States, constitutional rights are directly applicable in the private relations
between the market players. See ELENI FRANTIZIOU, THE HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF
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shape of the final product. The GDPR, direct descendant of
the 95/46 directive and the 108 Convention, would impose
much more strict general rules than the American system.
However, it would also focus primarily on the individual,
rather than collective interests, apply only to “identifiable”
persons, and employ technocratic solutions rather than
political ones.
To be clear, proving that the 1973 Report directly
influenced the 1981 Convention 108 is a difficult task, and I
would not defend a strong claim that without the Report, the
European system would necessarily look differently. Other
European countries, like Great Britain or Sweden, have been
adopting their own data protection laws at the time, and we
know that the authors of the 1973 Report were in contact
with them.111 One can only assume that the exchange of
ideas happened in both directions. However, two things can
be demonstrated beyond doubt. First, the final product of the
Council of Europe, and ultimately the GDPR, follows the
structure and terminology of the 1973 Report’s
recommendations. Second, when Council of Europe
commissioned its own recommendations in 1973112 and
1974,113 they used different terminology and ultimately
adopted that of the 1973 Report (they spoke of “personal
information” instead of “personal data,” “individuals” instead
of “data subjects” etc.). However, from the policy perspective,
it does not matter whether the drafters of the European
regime read the 1973 Report and decided to implement it, or
whether these ideas the Report enshrined made their way to
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
(2019).

IN THE

EUROPEAN UNION: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

111. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at x.
112. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Res. (74) 29 On the Protection of the
Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector (Sept.
26, 1973), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCT
MContent?documentId=0900001680502830.
113. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Res. (74) 29 On the Protection of the
Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Public Sector (Sept.
20, 1974), https://rm.coe.int/16804d1c51.
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Europe through the conversations among experts indirectly
through the 1980 OECD guidelines. What matters is that
already in 1973 the American administration was in
possession of the report suggesting something very similar to
today’s GDPR and that both the American law and the GDPR
failed to properly respond to challenges that this Report set
forth.
Before discussing the current shape of both regimes, the
ways in which they lead to the creation of the data analytics
society, and the ways in which they fail at mitigating the
social costs, let us first see what the last forty-five years of
socio-technological changes brought about. To fully
appreciate the mistakes which were committed while forging
the “notice and choice” and “personal data protection”
models, one needs to better understand the sociotechnological reality at the dawn of the 2020s. What goes
without saying, a lot has changed since 1973.
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II. SOCIAL COSTS OF DATA MANAGEMENT
When identifying the threats of using computers to
process personal data, the authors of the 1973 Report were
engaging in speculation, but it turns out that they were
prescient. Forty-five years later, we have empirical studies
documenting what the negative effects of technological data
processing have become, and are able to see which of them
resulted from not having lived up to the recommendations
put forward. In this Part, I analyze the developments in the
techno-sociological practice of collection and usage of
personal data and study the social costs they generate. These
costs encompass both the knowledge that companies are able
to infer about people and the various negative effects of using
this knowledge in their interactions. I look at three
examples: price discrimination, behavior manipulation, and
social segmentation; and show how the law we have today
sanctions these costly behaviors, as well as why it is unable
to prevent them. After this analysis, I will move to the closer
study of both models of data governance in Part III.
A. Technological Foundations of the Data Analytics Society
Three significant technological breakthroughs have
occurred since the publication of the 1973 Report: the
miniaturization and widespread distribution of (mobile)
computers,114 the emergence of the public internet,115 and
the rise of machine learning techniques regarding data
analytics and problem-solving.116 As of today, in 2020, it is

114. See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY & WILLIAN ASPRAY, COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF
INFORMATION MACHINE 233–300 (1996); ADAM GREENFIELD, EVERYWARE: THE
DAWNING AGE OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2006); GEORGES IFRAH, THE UNIVERSAL
HISTORY OF COMPUTING: FROM THE ABACUS TO THE QUANTUM COMPUTER 302–47
(2001).
115. See JANET ABBATE, INVENTING
supra note 34, at 26–30.

THE

INTERNET 195–200 (1999); ZITTRAIN,

116. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 9; Nello Cristianini, The Road to Artificial
Intelligence: A Case of Data Over Theory, NEW SCIENTIST (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23230971-200-the-irresistible-rise-of-
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common for individuals to own personal computers and
mobile devices,117 constantly connected to the internet,
serving as access points to various online services. Some
previously analog activities, like shopping, news
consumption or banking have gradually moved online; some
new forms of social behavior, like social media, “sharing
economy”118 or multimedia streaming have emerged. At the
same time, these devices and services function as data
collectors for tech companies.
The “data analytics society” we currently live in, I argue,
is characterized by three latent effects: (i) seamless data
collection, facilitated by people’s usage of smartphones and
other connected devices; (ii) inferred knowledge, that is
corporations’ ability to find patterns in data sets and
establish probabilities using machine learning techniques;
and (iii) automated decision making, where “decision” should
be understood broadly, as a computer’s choice to generate
some output without a direct command by a human, for
example, to show a particular ad to a particular person in a
given moment.119 All three phenomena are interrelated, but
for analytical purposes let us consider each separately.
Seamless data collection is possible due to individuals’
continuous reliance on technology. When a person carries an
internet-connected smartphone on them all the time, it is
difficult to draw a sharp distinction between being “online”
and “offline.”120 All the activities undertaken via a
artificial-intelligence/.
117. According to PEW Research, as of June 2019, 81% of Americans own a
smartphone, three quarters own a laptop or a personal computer, and nearly half
owns a tablet device. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/.
118. For the definition of the concept, see ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING
ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM
26–27 (2016). For the overview of the legal challenges posed by the sharing
economy, see THE SHARING ECONOMY: LEGAL PROBLEMS OF A PERMUTATIONS AND
COMBINATIONS SOCIETY (Maria Regina Redinha et al. eds., 2019).
119. See Mik supra note 4, at 1.
120. Philosophers of technology call this phenomenon the “onlife world.” See
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smartphone leave a digital footprint.121 From dating to
searching for information to shopping, to transport and to
communications, more and more data is generated as a side
product of our daily activities. If one halts a taxi on a street
and pays cash, there is no record. Uber makes a record. When
one eats in a restaurant, there is no record. Grubhub makes
a record. When one consults a physical encyclopedia, there is
no record. Google knows what we are searching for. All this
data collection occurs in the background, sometimes without
individuals’ knowledge, and usually without any human’s
additional effort to store information on top of conducting the
service. The “easy access” that the authors of the 1973 Report
worried about has become a reality, both due to the
technological developments, and the law’s sanctioning of
these practices. An individual’s “choice” in the American law,
and a “consent” in the European model are sufficient legal
basis to collect personal data and share it with other
organizations.122
As a side product, large amounts of data are generated.
Ethem Alpaydin calls this the “dataquake”,123 while the term
best known to the general public is “big data.”124 Big data is
often characterized by the “3 Vs”: volume, variety, and

Mireille Hildebrandt, Dualism is Dead. Long Live Plurality (Instead of Duality),
in THE ONLIFE MANIFESTO: BEING HUMAN IN A HYPERCONNECTED ERA 27 (Luciano
Floridi ed., 2015).
121. See Carrie Leonetti, Bigfoot: Data Mining, the Digital Footprint, and the
Constitutionalization of Inconvenience, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 260, 300 (2014);
Agnieszka A. McPeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and
Consistent Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 887, 893–94 (2013); Sandi S. Varnado, Your Digital Footprint Left behind at
Death: An Illustration of Technology Leaving the Law Behind, 74 LA. L. REV. 719,
721 (2014).
122. See infra Part III.
123. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 9, at 10–16.
124. For the definition of the concept, see Thomas Hoeren, Big Data and Data
Quality, in BIG DATA IN CONTEXT: LEGAL, SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL INSIGHTS
(Thomas Hoeren & Barbara Kolany Raiser eds., 2018); see also Talia B. Gillis &
Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459 (2019).
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velocity.125 From the perspective of a human mind, there is
too much data to process, the sets are too heterogeneous to
make sense of, and the speed of analysis necessary to process
them surpasses our abilities. Recall that “too much data to
process” has also been identified as one of the latent effects
of computerization by the authors of the 1973 Report. What
they feared would happen was the organizations “simplifying
the world,” distorting the picture of reality by forcing people
to fit themselves into the pre-defined categories. In some
spheres, this did indeed occur.126 However, there was
another possible strategy for organizations to adopt. Instead
of simplifying the data, one could try to increase the
performance of data analyzing technologies. And this is what
happened. Data analytics, and in particular machine
learning, underwent significant progress in the last decade,
turning the “too much data to process” burden into a data
blessing.127
Inferred knowledge results from organizations’ ability to
apply sophisticated data analytics techniques to detect
patterns in the big data collections.128 Data now reveals more
information about individuals than what one could directly
observe. Studied in isolation, the fact that I am of a given
gender and age, live in a specific town, like chicken waffles
and Marvel movies, might say not much more than simply
that. However, this data, seen against data about millions of
other people who in some regard are “(not) like me,” and
additional data about them, allows companies to infer what
are my political views,129 what products I might be willing to
buy, and what social cause to donate to. This is not
“knowledge” in the sense in which philosophers would define

125. Andrea De Mauro et al., A Formal Definition of Big Data Based on its
Essential Features, 65 LIBR. REV. 122, 130–31 (2016).
126. See O’NEIL, supra note 50, at 3–9, 23–27, 71–76.
127. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 9, at 15.
128. Id. at 10–20.
129. See DellaPosta, supra note 14, at 1473.
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it, but is what Ethem Alpaydin calls “a good and useful
approximation.”130 If a company knows something about me
with an 87% probability, this “knowledge” presents
significant value.
This knowledge can be further refined, through
automatic communication and feedback loops. Have you ever
seen an irrelevant ad and thought “how would they ever
think that I can be into that?!” One of the reasons why the
algorithm displayed it to you might have been to confirm the
probability that people within your demographics are not
interested in such things. Various technological
advancements, in particular machine learning, are currently
being employed to not only find patterns in existing data sets
but also to refine these data sets, test hypotheses and fill in
the loopholes.131 This “knowledge” can later be used in an
automated way. To stay with the example of advertisements,
a task that a human gives to a machine could be “display this
ad to 1000 people with the highest probability of clicking.”
The machine would estimate, based on the existing data, who
has the highest chance of clicking (or even start at random)
and then through numerous feedback loops improve the
estimation over time.132
Apart from advertising, this technology can power
“decisions” on what flight price to display,133 whose profile to
show on dating apps, or what music to suggest. Automated
“decision” making pertains not only to “decisions” in the
strict sense (grant or refuse a credit card, approve a refund
or invite for a job interview); but essentially all activities of
computer-systems that are not 100% pre-programmed.
Given the machine-learning basis of these systems, humans

130. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 9, at 14.
131. Id. at 113–68.
132. Id.
133. See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Michael P. Wellman, Automated Markets
and Trading Agents, in 2 HANDBOOK OF COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS (Leigh
Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd eds., 2006).
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developing and deploying them will have a general idea on
what the software will do (the goals are specified manually);
but might not be able to fully predict all possible outcomes
(resulting from the available data).134 Importantly, these
“automated decisions” are, at the same time, a tool to provide
services and to collect new/feedback data. In this sense, when
a “smart” algorithm performs a task, it simultaneously tries
to achieve the best possible outcome and generates feedback
on its own performance, so that the next time, it will be more
efficient. It is these characteristics taken together that led to
a widespread popular referral to machine-learning-based
technologies as “artificial intelligence.”135
Note two things. First, for all this to function it is by no
means necessary that you are “personally identified” or
“identifiable.”136 In many cases, companies engaging in
commercial activities based on data collection, analysis and
automated communication really do not need to know what
is your name, Social Security Number, address or any other

134. The humans’ ability to understand the logic of the big-data fueled and
machine-learning powered systems is being discussed under the label of the
“black box” problem. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 6–7 (2015). But see
Agnieszka Jablonowska & Przemyslaw Palka, EU Consumer Law and Artificial
Intelligence, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
HANS-W. MICKLITZ (Lucila de Almeida et al. eds., 2019).
135. Machine learning is a subset of artificial intelligence. See ALPAYDIN, supra
note 9; Cristianini, supra note 116. Several scholarly and policy initiatives aimed
at identifying legal challenges associated with the emergence of artificial
intelligence have been launched in recent years, including Harvard’s and MIT’s
“Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence,” overview available at:
https://www.media.mit.edu/groups/ethics-and-governance/overview/ (last visited
Mar. 17, 2020), and Yale’s “AI, Ethics and Society,” overview available at
https://aiethicsyale.wordpress.com/. Nevertheless, one should remember that as
long as discussions about normative implications of artificial intelligence are
concerned with the real-world developments, and not thought experiments, they
pertain to the development and usage of machine learning. See MACIEJ KUZIEMSKI
& PRZEMYSLAW PAŁKA, EUR. U. INST. SCH. OF TRANSNAT’L GOVERNANCE, AI
GOVERNANCE POST-GDPR: LESSONS LEARNED AND THE ROAD AHEAD 1 (2019)
(“[G]overnance of AI will in practice mean policies regarding both the design and
access to algorithms, as well as collection and usage of information.”).
136. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 26, at 1818.

2020]

DATA MANAGEMENT LAW

595

personal characteristic. What they need to know is what
features you have and how you behave in response to what
stimuli. There needs to be an ability to track you somehow
(for example, by assigning a number to your browser or your
device), but from a corporation’s point of view, it is often
perfectly fine if you are anonymous. Legally speaking, many
companies might prefer not to personally identify you—the
less they know who you are, the more they are legally
allowed to learn about how you are.137 That is one of the
reasons why “privacy” approaches based on the concept of
“personally identifiable information” do not fully match the
potential risks in the data analytics society. It might be the
case that in situations where individual and societal
interests are most at stake, privacy protections simply are
not triggered.
Second, notice the externalities. By allowing a company
to collect and study information about myself, even if we
assume I am fully aware of what they plan to do with my
data, I impose a cost on (or at least make a decision about)
you and other people. If I make it clear what my political
views or religious convictions are, essentially everything I do
online can later be used to infer knowledge about other
people’s religion and politics. “Everything you say can and
will be used against other people” would be a fair statement
to include in the privacy policies written within the “notice
and choice” paradigm. The more things I buy on Amazon, the
more refined suggestions to other customers will be. If I am
convinced, or not convinced, by a political ad, I help ensure
that its next reiteration will be even more successful in
manipulating people’s preferences and behavior. Even if I
fully agree to the collection of my data, I impose costs on you
and our fellow humans. I should not be allowed to do this so
easily.
These two aspects, the possibility to harm people while
they are anonymous, and the risk of being harmed as a result
137. Id.
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of other people’s actions, are significant weaknesses of the
current approaches to data management. In the following
section, I study three examples of these harms, i.e. social
costs of data management, in detail. Having done so, in Part
III, I will demonstrate how this state of affairs is sanctioned
by the existing data management laws, and pinpoint where
I believe they should be modified.
B. Direct and Indirect Social Costs: Knowledge In-Use and
Knowledge In-Itself
Two general types of social costs exist in the data
analytics society: new knowledge about persons, and the
potentially negative consequences of acting upon that
knowledge. On the one hand, there are external effects of
individual behavior concerned with knowledge: when
disclosing some personal data, I indirectly reveal information
about other people. This does not yet bring about actual
harms to others, but increases the potential for harm. On the
other hand, there are costs of the uses to which companies
can put this knowledge. Data-driven price discrimination,
behavior manipulation or social segmentation are actions
costly to some people, and the society as a whole, resulting
from the technological capabilities of tech companies and the
law’s sanctioning of these practices.
The distinction between “knowledge in-itself” and “inuse,” or between potential and actual harms, matters not
only conceptually, but also policy-wise. Depending on one’s
normative theory, one could argue that the mere fact that
Amazon, Google or Facebook know so much about their users
is problematic and should be prevented; or emphasize that
we should prevent only certain activities based on this data.
Further, as I will show in Part IV, both collection and usage
can be objects of regulation, and the choice will depend on
one’s regulatory objectives. With these distinctions in mind,
let us consider three examples of costly external effects: price
discrimination, behavior manipulation, and social
segmentation.
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First, consider price discrimination.138 Put simply, price
discrimination means charging different customers different
prices for exactly the same good or service. Imagine two
people, Amy and Barbara, none of whom directly reveals
what their income is. Amy is friends on Facebook with
colleagues boasting about their high-paid jobs, watches
videos about golf, and searches with Google for piano classes
for children.139 Assume that this suggests, with a high
probability, that her income is above $100,000. Barbara, on
the other hand, engages in online activities associated with
a low-income social group. Now consider a company, let us
call it Umbrella Corporation, selling widgets. Imagine that a
total cost of producing and marketing a widget is $10, so any
price above $10 generates profit. Assume that in a brick-andmortar retail store, where the same price must be used
regardless of who is the buyer, Umbrella would sell widgets
at the supply and demand equilibrium price of $15. Online,
however, Umbrella has access to information about Amy and
Barbara and can try to display different prices to different
customers. Based on the knowledge inferred about Amy’s
and Barbara’s income, it charges the former $20, while the
latter $11. This is costly for Amy, who ends up paying $5
more than she normally would, but beneficial for Barbara
and for the Umbrella Corporation.
Second, think about behavior manipulation.140 Imagine
that Umbrella Corporation engages in online advertising,

138. See Bar-Gill, supra note 3, at 271; Woodcock, supra note 17, at 1372–74;
see also Julie Cohen, Irrational Privacy?, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L
241, 245 (2012).
139. For empirical evidence that such behavior is a good predictor of higher
income, see ELIZABETH CURRID-HALKETT, THE SUM OF SMALL THINGS: A THEORY
OF THE ASPIRATIONAL CLASS (2017).
140. See ZUBOFF, supra note 58; Mik, supra note 4; Rory Van Loo, Helping
Buyers Beware: The Need For Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311,
1331–43 (2015).
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and wants to increase the chance of consumers purchasing
widgets while browsing the net on their smartphones. What
makes e-commerce different from brick and mortar shops is
the option of immediate purchases, clicking on an ad and
having concluded a contract three minutes later. Umbrella
collects data about past engagement, and its algorithm
establishes that people with characteristics similar to Amy
are most prone to buy the widget when seeing the ad early in
the morning, especially if they went to sleep later than usual.
Amy-types also like the widget being advertised by fit, young
people. At the same time, people with characteristics similar
to Barbara, most often buy widgets when shown the ad late
at night, and especially when coming back from their
friends’. They are most convinced by ads that have widgets
advertised by people who look like a happy family. With this
knowledge, Umbrella fine-tunes the timing, content, and
form of the widget ads, and manages to increase the sales by
20%. This is profitable to Umbrella but can be costly to Amy
and Barbara. If for most of the time, they would not be
willing to buy a widget, but do so when shown an ad at the
moment when they are most prone to engage in unnecessary
spending, the actual cost they pay is higher than the overall
utility they derive from owning a widget. This, again, is
possible not because they have revealed anything about their
preferences or behavior patterns, but because other people,
with similar characteristics, have done so.
Third, there is a risk of social segmentation,
discrimination, or even social exclusion.141 Imagine that
Umbrella Corporation wants its products to be associated
only with certain social classes. It will attempt to display the
widget ads only to those who seem to belong to these classes.
In the world of billboards, TV ads and brick and mortar
stores, most members of the society can see ads of the same
products, and most of them have the ability to buy those

141. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 52; Gillis & Spiees, supra note 124;
Sweeney, supra note 6.
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products in physical stores. However, in a data analytics
society, when everyone sees mostly their own set of ads,
displayed on their own smartphones, social segmentation
can occur. Only people like Amy are offered to buy widgets,
while people like Barbara are not. Or imagine that Umbrella
Corporation wants to hire new workers, and for some reason
ends up displaying the job-ads only to people like Amy. Or,
in this case, probably people like Andy.142 This is costly for
Barbara-types, who not only are not offered to buy a widget
or work for Umbrella, but might even not be aware of these
products’ and jobs’ existence. This is also costly for society as
well. If different members of a community are exposed to
different types of content, the social division, resulting from
exposure to different communications, might increase.
2. The Politics of Data-Driven Social Costs
One could argue that all the costs described above are
neither new nor necessarily bad. In the end, one could say,
sellers always wanted to maximize profits by charging the
highest possible price and engaging in the most convincing
advertising. Consumers and workers have always bought
different products, and worked different kinds of jobs,
depending on their material situation. This is how capitalism
works, and even though the system is not perfect, and some
inequalities will necessarily persist, the overall outcome is
the best possible one.
These two objections must be addressed together.
I argue that the question of whether data-driven social
costs are new or not is a wrong question to ask. No one can
deny that the above-mentioned practices existed, in some
form, long before the emergence of computers, not to mention
the internet and machine learning. At the same time, it is
difficult to refute a claim that the amount of knowledge that

142. Umbrella Corporation’s employment ad might target a man, given the
widespread gender bias in online job ads delivery. See Barocas & Selbst, supra
note 52, at 681–87.
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corporations have accumulated about individuals, paired
with their ability to directly act upon that knowledge, is
unprecedented. The source of this knowledge has shifted as
well, from individuals freely disclosing information about
themselves, to having knowledge inferred from the behavior
of others who, themselves, might not realize what data is
being collected. Whether these shifts make up a qualitative
or only quantitative change is, ultimately, of secondary
importance. What matters is that they have occurred, and
normative questions can be asked about them.
This paper makes a plea to bring these questions to the
fore. Whether the practices discussed above should be
assessed negatively and mitigated through regulation, or
not, is ultimately a political decision to make. Let us get back
to the examples for a while.
Imagine that Umbrella Corporation shows higher prices
to people whom it believes are wealthier and lower to those
whom it believes possess fewer funds. One could argue that,
given the inequalities in society, it is fair if richer people
subsidize purchases by those less fortunate. Or, one could
argue that these practices should be discouraged, as they
diminish the overall efficiency and lead to a quasimonopolistic behavior. However, imagine that Umbrella does
the opposite. Since it wishes to have widgets associated only
with some social classes, it ends up showing a higher price to
Barbara, and lower to Amy. Does this change our normative
assessment? Does the type of product they offer matter?
Would it make a difference if Umbrella was selling
pharmaceutical products, or energy, or books?
Further, consider a world in which Umbrella does not
sell widgets, but leads an election campaign of a certain
political party. Instead of encouraging people to buy its
products, it uses all the data it manages to find to discourage
people from voting for the other party.143 Or, it manages to
143. As was the case with the Cambridge Analytics scandal. See Nicholas
Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So
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modify people’s news feeds in a way that leads to a social
segmentation of the content they ultimately receive.144
Would our assessment of its activities change if, instead of
marketing products, Umbrella Corporation engaged in datadriven behavior manipulation and social segmentation
aimed at influencing an outcome of a political process?
The answer is yes, such details matter. Possibly, certain
outcomes of data-driven behavior invite more regulatory
scrutiny than others. However, to know that, we need to
understand the data-driven practices of tech companies, as
the authors of the 1973 Report argued. And we need to
engage in deliberations about these practices, in political,
issue-by-issue manner. Unfortunately, as of today, the
answer regarding the acceptable uses of data about persons
is given by individualistic, technocratic, “one-size-fits-all”
solutions offered by “notice and choice” and “personal data
protection” regimes.145
In the following Part, I show how the currently binding
legal regimes were created, to help legal reformers
understand why the law ended up sanctioning these types of
costly practices, and in what aspects these regimes are illsuited to manage the costs of data analytics.

Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/
cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html.
144. The Wall Street Journal’s “Blue Feed, Red Feed” Project provides insights
on this front. See Blue Feed, Red Feed, WALL ST. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/bluefeed-red-feed (last updated Aug. 19, 2019).
145. See infra Part III.
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III. THE EXISTING PARADIGMS: “NOTICE AND CHOICE” VS.
“PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION”
As of 2020, two competing visions of data management
law exist in the transatlantic sphere: the American “notice
and choice” model and the European “personal data
protection” model.146 Both can be traced back to the 1973
Report and the recommendations it made. In many aspects,
they look very much unlike one another. However, even
though the American system is grounded in market logic,
while the European system is in the logic of human rights,
both fall prey to the same three mistakes. Both look at the
problem of social costs of data management through the lens
of “privacy,” both concentrate on individual interests instead
of collective ones, and both employ technocratic means to
address these costs.
A. American Model: Individual “Notice and Choice”

Within the “notice and choice” paradigm, companies that
want to collect and use personal information about the users
of their websites and apps should inform the customers about
their data practices (“notice”). In turn, consumers decide
whether they are willing to use the services and disclose
personal information to companies or not (“choice”).147
“Notice” usually occurs through a publication of a “privacy
policy” (sometimes called a “privacy notice”),148 while the
choice might be either expressed explicitly when ticking a
box next to a statement like “I have read and accept the
privacy policy,” or implicitly through accessing the service or
using the app.149 In this sense, “notice and choice” posits the

146. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
147. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 585–90.
148. Id.
149. Various privacy policies contain a “consent by use” clause. See, e.g., Under
Armour Privacy Policy, UNDER ARMOUR (May 20, 2018), https://account.
underarmour.com/en-us/privacy (“By using the services, you consent to the
collection, use and transfer of your personal data for processing in the united
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decision about acceptable data practices as a market
transaction between a user and the company.
This market logic has profound consequences for the
shape of the normative framework governing data practices,
and ultimately for the nature of the data analytics society.
The answer to a legal question a company might ponder:
“what data am I allowed to collect, and what can I do with
it?” stems from a contract. This contract is written by the
company itself, and offered to consumers in a boilerplate
form, “take it or leave it,” with no space for negotiation.150 As
long as the company clearly states its plans in the “privacy
policy,” and the consumers accept it, the contents of the
contract essentially make up the norms the company must
abide by.
Whether a privacy policy should be considered a “real”
contract or not is disputed in the legal scholarship, with
arguments being raised both for the affirmative and the
negative answer.151 However, this disagreement is about the
most common form of enforcement of privacy policies, not
their norm-creating nature. What suffices to state here is
that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is ready to police
companies that do not abide by their own policies.152 It does
so based on Section 5, giving the FTC mandate to police
“unfair and deceptive trade practices.”153 FTC will both
initiate proceedings against companies who do act contrary

states as described in this privacy policy.”).
150. For a discussion of legal, sociological and philosophical implications of the
mass-usage of boilerplate contracts, see Daniel Markovits, Good Faith
Bargaining in the Shadow of a Form, in DEFENCES IN CONTRACT (Andrew Dyson
et al. eds., 2017).
151. For the arguments supporting the affirmative answer, see Oren Bar-Gill,
Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the Common Law:
The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2017). For the opposite view, see Solove & Hartzog, supra
note 8, at 595–97.
152. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 598–605.
153. Id. at 598–99.
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to their own policies,154 as well as analyze the contents of
these policies to determine whether the stipulated practices
could be deemed “unfair.”155
In other words, the freedom of these “contracts” is not
absolute, but most of the constraints do not come from any
statutes. Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hertzog argue that,
even though the majority of the FTC’s enforcement activities
end up being settled, corporations attach such high
importance to the contents of these settlements, that one
could even treat them as a new type of “common law.”156
Nevertheless, in their own words:
There is no federal law that directly protects the privacy of data
collected and used by merchants such as Macy’s and Amazon.com.
Nor is there a federal law focused on many of the forms of data
collection in use by companies such as Facebook and Google.157

The internal logic of the “notice and choice” model is
individual-focused and market-based. Ultimately, users’
acceptance of the privacy policies is being equated with their
agreement to the practices foreseen, and this agreement is
treated as a sufficient legal basis for norm-creation. This
model ignores the potential of externalities, disregards
collective interests, and posits the market as a superior tool
to politics for social ordering. At the same time, when forging
this regime, its creators referred to the 1973 Report and,
allegedly, were inspired by it.158 The context of this model’s
origin is crucial for understanding its logic, and the source of
its shortcomings.

154. Id. at 628–30.
155. Id. at 638–43.
156. Id. at 610–19.
157. Id. at 587.
158. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998)
[hereinafter 1998 FTC REPORT], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf.
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1. The Emergence of “Notice and Choice”: the 1990s and
the (Neo-)Liberal Fever
A sympathetic reading of the history of “notice and
choice” would try to explain its emergence through a genuine
belief of its forgers that the economic freedom leads to other
freedoms, competition generally works well, and so markets
are the most favorable means for deciding the data
management rules. A cynical reading, on the other hand,
would be that the “notice and choice” model was essentially
invented by the lobbyists of the marketing companies and
tolerated by the Government, which saw an opportunity for
creating a privately run surveillance system, useful
especially in the aftermath of 2001. The correct
interpretation does not necessarily lie in the middle, but
almost certainly lies between these two positions.
“Notice and choice” was born in the 1990s, continuing the
sectoral trend in American privacy regulation. When the
Internet went public in 1995, both its potential for commerce
and for abuse was quickly recognized. In June 1996 the FTC
Staff held a “Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the
Global Information Infrastructure,” and in December
published a report summarizing the proceedings.159 The
document opens with a characterization of “limitless
opportunities” offered by the new, online marketplace.160
According to the 1996 report’s authors, the benefits
stemming from anyone’s ability to easily gather personal
information online “are apparent, both for consumers and for
industry”.161 Overall efficiency will rise because marketers
will spend less money on reaching the potential clients, while

159. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER
PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1996), https://www.ftc
.gov/reports/staff-report-public-workshop-consumer-privacy-global-informationinfrastructure [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT].
160. Id. ch. 1.
161. Id.
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consumers will spend less time looking for the information
that interests them.162 However, the authors continue:
The proliferation of readily available personal information . . . could
jeopardize personal privacy and facilitate fraud and deception.
These risks may make consumers reluctant to use the Internet or
participate in online transactions and therefore could prevent
consumers from obtaining the benefits promised by online
commerce.163

Note the subtle move from privacy intrusions and
deception being legitimate concerns on their own terms, to
being problematic as potential barriers/deterrents in access
to the market. Consumers’ primary source of benefits is
participation in the marketplace, and so circumstances
preventing them from participation should be taken care of.
Within this setting, the Workshop participants sought to find
the appropriate response. Acknowledging that some cases,
particularly health data, financial data,164 and data about
children,165 might require specialized responses, the overall
tone of the report seemed much more favorable to “soft
solutions” like education and business self-regulation than
legislative intervention.166 This document, publicly available
but still internal, shaped what would follow in the year to
come.
In 1998 the FTC submitted its official report, titled
“Privacy Online,”167 to Congress. Reiterating the belief that
internet is “an exciting new marketplace for consumers,”168
the FTC observed that “there are also indications that
consumers are wary of participating in it because of concerns

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. ch. 2.
165. Id. ch. 4.
166. Id. ch. 3.
167. 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 158.
168. Id. at i.
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about how their personal information is used.” 169 Having
considered both, the FTC stated that, in its view, the proper
way to proceed is “to encourage and facilitate effective selfregulation as the preferred approach to protecting consumer
privacy online.”170 The 1998 Report contained its own,
morphed set of “Fair Information Practice Principles.”
Referring to the 1973 Report (which the 1998 Report labels
“seminal”) and several international documents, including
the 1980 OECD guidelines and the 1995 EU Directive, the
FTC listed five, “widely accepted” principles:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Notice/Awareness;
Choice/Consent;
Access/Participation;
Integrity/Security;
Enforcement/Redress.171

Although they are clear and relatable, these principles
look little like those expressed in their alleged source, the
1973 Report. On the one hand, this re-formulation must be
applauded for its concise and succinct communication of the
1973 Report’s plea for public notice, for facilitating data
subjects’ rights to access and correct the data, and for
ensuring security and proper enforcement of the normative
frameworks governing processing. On the other, several key
aspects are missing.
The 1998 FTC Report does not mention the social aspects
of data management at all. Among the threats, it sees
privacy and deception as potential barriers to the market;
but does not speak about the “coercive potential” so strongly
underlined by the authors of the 1973 Report. Apart from
direct negative effects stemming from unwanted disclosure
of personal information, or failures of the systems to be
secure, the Report sees no policy-decisions to be taken
169. Id.
170. Id. at i–ii.
171. Id. at 7–11.
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regarding the tradeoffs between more efficient markets and
the rising power of private organizations to predict and
influence the behavior of individuals. As a result, the
recommendations it makes differ from those expressed in the
1973 Report not only regarding the perceived superiority of
self-regulation over legislation (i.e. the form of intervention),
but also the substance. The 1998 Report does not see a place
for the “purpose limitation principle,” i.e. the rule according
to which data gathered for one purpose should not be used
for other purposes. With the exception of data about children,
to which the 1998 Report attaches special attention,172 the
view of the potential risks and necessary responses has been
much more relaxed than in 1973.
The legal response on the side of the Government closely
mirrored these views. Several statutes, regarding the areas
identified as sensitive, were passed, including the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,173 the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998174 and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.175 For the rest of the
internet-driven data collection practices, self-regulation, to
be enforced by the FTC, has been chosen as the preferred
approach. As a result, a one-size-fits-all, market-grounded
and individual-centered approach has become the paradigm
of the American data management law.
One thing is perplexing. How was it possible that in the
1970s, the emergence of huge, bulky and expensive
computers used in private and public organization gave rise
to worries about individual freedom and necessary political
choices; while in the 1990s the emergence of a global network
connecting personal computers in everyone’s homes to these
172. Id. at 4, 12–13.
173. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
174. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-170
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012)).
175. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012)).
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organizations’ databases did not? Why, when the potential
for abuse got higher, did the political response become more
relaxed? Four possible reasons, not necessarily mutually
exclusive, come to one’s mind.
First, the geopolitical context has changed dramatically.
1973 was the middle of the Cold War, with nuclear
proliferation, Space Race, and proxy wars around the globe
giving people a general sense of worry. In the 1990s, the
overall climate in the West was triumphant. With the defeat
of communism, a capitalist liberal democracy in a globalizing
world seemed not only the inevitable, but also the best
political-economic choice.176 This triumphant liberalism has
been particularly strong regarding the internet, with legal
articles expressing doubts about nation states’ ability to
govern the “cyberspace”177 and activists expressing
opposition to the desirability of doing that.178 Lawrence
Lessig describes these societal feelings well in his Code
2.0.179 Second, one could argue that in 1998 computers were

176. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 THE NAT’L INT. 3, 3–4
(1989).
177. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
178. John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 6, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspaceindependence. Barlow famously expressed the sentiment:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the
future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome
among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected
government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no
greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I
declare the global social space we are building to be naturally
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no
moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we
have true reason to fear.
179. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 3 (2006). Professor Lessig writes:
[I]n the spring of 1995, while teaching the law of cyberspace, I saw in my
students these very same postcommunist thoughts about freedom and
government. Even at Yale—not known for libertarian passions—the
students seemed drunk with what James Boyle would later call the
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no longer “new.” People got used to the idea, and nothing
terrible had happened since the 1970s, so naturally, the
worries were lower. Third, one could explain the change by
corporate capture. Lobbyists sold the idea to the lawmakers.
The 1998 Report is clear about their participation in the FTC
Workshops.180 Marc Rotenberg, writing in 2001, argued:
The traditional complement to “notice” had long been “consent,” and
the problem that attracted privacy scholars and policymakers was
to determine what would constitute adequate or meaningful
consent. . . . The “notice and choice” formulation put forward by the
Direct Marketing Association in 1996 provided an opportunity for
the marketing industry to avoid resolving the difficult problem of
what would constitute meaningful consent. 181

Seeing benefit in being allowed to collect and use
personal data freely, without burdensome regulatory
requirements, corporations, in particular marketing
professionals, promoted not only the self-regulation as a
means to realize the policy goals, but also the very
philosophical foundation of market-centered individual
freedom. As a result:
Subtly, but powerfully and profoundly, the substitution of “notice
and choice” for “notice and consent” transferred the protection of
privacy from the legal realm, and from an emphasis on the
articulation of rights and responsibilities, to the marketplace,
where consumers would now be forced to pay for what the law could
otherwise provide.182
....

“libertarian gotcha”: no government could survive without the Internet’s
riches, yet no government could control the life that went on there. Realspace governments would become as pathetic as the last Communist
regimes: It was the withering of the state that Marx had promised, jolted
out of existence by trillions of gigabytes flashing across the ether of
cyberspace.
180. See 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 158, at i.
181. See Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 10.
182. Id. at 11.
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One cannot escape the conclusion that privacy policy in the United
States today reflects what industry is prepared to do rather than
what the public wants done.183

To be clear, not least because the lobbying has not been
perfectly documented, establishing a causal link between
particular events and the ultimate outcome is a very difficult
task. On top of these considerations, one should also note the
fourth possible reason, and that is a silent alliance of
business and the US Government, where the latter saw an
opportunity in creating a privately-owned surveillance
technology. I do not want to argue for or against that, though
I would mention that the NSA scandal showed that even if
this was not already the Government’s intention back in the
1990s, it clearly grasped that potential in the years to
follow.184
The overall ideology in which the “notice and choice”
model has been forged was a market- and individualcentered economic liberalism. As a result, the problem of
data management by tech companies has been reduced to
“consumer privacy,” and the solution to this problem was by
definition going to concentrate on individual interests, best
protected (in the view of the model’s creators) by the market.
Furthermore, the “privacy” framing meant that law governs
only the situations when an individual can be “personally
identified,” and not those where she is anonymous, even if
she can still be affected by data practices. These beliefs make
up the ideological and legal foundation of the data analytics
society in 2020.
2. The Original Sin: A Market-Individual as the Sole
Subject of Disclosure and Decisions
There are three problems with constructing a datamanagement law around an individual who is expected to
183. Id. at 34.
184. See Karina Rider, The Privacy Paradox: How Market Privacy Facilitates
Government Surveillance, 21 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y, no. 10, 2018, at 1369, 1369
(2018).
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make decisions as a market actor. First, individuals’
understanding of “privacy policies” is necessarily limited.
Second, even if individuals understood these documents,
given the existence of social costs, they are not normatively
competent to decide to impose these costs on other people.
Third, individuals’ say about these matters should not be
voiced as a part of a market transaction, where they might
be in haste and have immediate interests at stake.
The idea of a “privacy policy” in the “notice and choice”
model is very different, even if seemingly connected, to the
“public notice” requirement advocated by the 1973 Report.
The addressee of the document is the consumer, not the
public. And the function of the document became a normcreating one, not merely information-conferring. The authors
of the 1973 Report imagined a world where public notices
allowed the public to engage in political deliberations and,
ultimately, legislation setting the limits on data collection
and usage. However, the paradigm adopted in the late 1990s
turned these “privacy policies” into contracts, ceding the
norm-making to the individual market actors.
Series of empirical studies now demonstrate that people
do not read privacy policies,185 and even if they do, they do
not understand them.186 Findings like these led Omri BenShahar and Carl Schneider to call mandated disclosure “the
most common and least successful regulatory technique in
American law.”187 This has to do with the human condition,
or what Daniel Solove calls structural and cognitive
reasons,188 but also with the condition of the privacy policies

185. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer
Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (2014); Obar &
Oeldorf-Hirsch, supra note 20, at 129.
186. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches
between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH.L.J. 39, 69
(2015).
187. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 3 (2014).

TO

188. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the
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themselves. Not only is their form often difficult to
comprehend, but also do not contain enough information to
make an informed decision.189 However, even if one assumes
that these problems could somehow be mitigated, the other
two remain.
Let us come back to the example of data-driven price
discrimination. Imagine that I do fully understand that
disclosing what my job is on Facebook will make it easier to
infer what the wealth of other people is. Imagine I do
understand that liking certain pages, or listening to
particular music, makes it even easier to draw such links.
Imagine that I even understand that as a result of my
acceptance of Facebook’s privacy policy, some people will be
shown higher prices of goods and services. Whether I
consider this a good deal or bad deal is beside the point here;
what matters is that I should not be given this choice in the
first place. The same holds with regard to other social costs
of data management: discrimination or behavioral effects. I
should not be the one to make this decision, and especially
not while looking for something online, and hastily
“accepting” privacy policies.
The limits for data collection and usage should be
established in a political process and enshrined in
regulation. The genetic code of the “notice and choice” model
is contrary to these requirements. The “notice and choice”
model essentially allows the companies to write the rules on
these limits, put them in the consumer “contracts,” and
derive their rights from individuals’ “choices.”

Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881 (2013).
189. See GIUSEPPE CONTISSA ET AL., BEUC, CLAUDETTE MEETS GDPR:
AUTOMATING THE EVALUATION OF PRIVACY POLICIES USING ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 3 (2018), https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-066_
claudette_meets_gdpr_report.pdf.
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B. European Model: “Personal Data Protection” Approach

In the meantime, our European colleagues have
developed a very different approach to dealing with data
management. The “personal data protection” model,
currently expressed in the GDPR, is a general law applicable
to all private and public organizations “processing”190 data
about residents of the European Union.191 Unlike the “notice
and choice model,” the GDPR does not see the relationship
regarding data as a market transaction. Rather, it creates a
range of administrative rules, governing any operation
undertaken on personal data; rules identical for businesses
and public authorities. These rules cannot be changed by
contract, and their violation results in administrative fines
imposed by specialized supervisory authorities.192

190. GDPR, supra note 32, art. 4, para. 2. The category is defined broadly:
[A]ny operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data
or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as
collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination,
restriction, erasure or destruction.
191. GDPR, supra note 32, art. 4, para. 1. “Personal data” is defined as follows:
[A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
(“data subject)”; an identifiable natural person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of
that natural person.
Hence, any operation regarding any data about a person who can be identified
falls within the material scope of the Regulation. It governs processing activities
of both private and public entities, id. art. 2, by firms incorporated in the EU or
“not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a)
the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data
subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union,” or “(b) the monitoring of
their behavior as far as their behavior takes place within the Union.” Id. art. 3,
para. 2.
192. See GDPR, supra note 32, art. 83.
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GDPR divides its regulatory framework into three
substantive groups: general principles,193, data subjects’
rights194 and data controllers’ obligations.195 However,
within the chapter on the subject’s rights, three substantial
articles are devoted to the issue of “transparency,” being
basically an obligation to engage in the public notice.196 If
one, for analytical purposes, separates these three from other
rights, and at the same time treats the data controller’s
obligations as correlated with subjects’ rights,197 one will see
the familiar triad of (i) general principles; (ii) public notice;
and (iii) subjects’ rights, exactly as advocated by the 1973
Report. However, one significant difference must be brought
to the fore: the GDPR treats “data protection” and “privacy”
as human rights. Among its three stated objectives, the
Regulation lists: “[protection of] fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons, in particular their right to the
protection of personal data.”198
This has significant consequences for the shape of the
“personal data protection” model. The legal requirements for
consent to be valid are much more rigid than those necessary
for a “choice” in American law.199 Further, any individual
interest violated through an operation undertaken on their

193. Id. ch. II.
194. Id. ch. III.
195. Id. ch. IV.
196. See Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Transparency under
Regulation 2016/679 (Apr. 11, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article
29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=622227.
197. Rights are correlated with duties. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 717–19
(1917).
198. GDPR, supra note 32, art. 1, para. 2. The other two stated objectives
include “[laying] down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement
of personal data” and facilitating “free movement of personal data within the
Union.” Id. art. 1, para. 1. The last objective stems from the EU’s goal,
establishing a common market.
199. See GDPR, supra note 32, art. 7; cf. supra Section III.A.

616

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

personal data might be treated as a human rights violation.
And human rights, unlike economic interests, cannot be a
subject of “cost-benefit analysis,”200 either in regulation or in
adjudication. They might be balanced against other human
rights,201 but not against interests like economic efficiency or
innovation. This, taken together with the EU’s “direct effect
doctrine,”202 results in an extremely rigid governance
framework, difficult to comply with by corporations
collecting data as a part of their business model, as many of
the tech companies do.203
At the same time, this law is still focused on the
individual, and frames her interests as a problem of
“privacy,” just like the “notice and choice” model. This
renders the GDPR blind to collective interests and
completely toothless when data cannot be directly linked to
an “identified or identifiable” person. Finally, GDPR also
applies a one-size-fits-all, technocratic approach to decide
what data practices are acceptable or not. The difference
being that the technocracy here is the domain of human
rights, not microeconomics. Either way, no space for political
choices has been foreseen. To understand the internal logic
of this system, let us take a look at historical and ideological
conditions of its emergence.
1. GDPR’s Genealogy: European Convention of Human
Rights
The first issue regarding the European approach to data
management is that the laws under consideration are
200. For a contemporary restatement of the cost-benefit analysis theory, and
its place in the functioning of the regulatory state, see CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COSTBENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018).
201. For the theoretical treatment of the rights-balancing in law, see Robert
Alexy, On Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural Comparison, 16 RATIO JURIS
433, 436, 439 (2003).
202. See FRANTZIOU, supra note 110.
203. Scholars have gone as far as to call the GDPR “incompatible” with the
very idea of big data analytics. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the
Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995, 1017 (2017).
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explicitly not a part of consumer law. Even though the
European Union has a robust system of consumer law in
place, in some ways mirroring the American approach (rules
against unfair and misleading commercial practices)204 and
in some ways going further (rules against unfair contractual
terms);205 these tools have not yet been put to work regarding
consumer data. Consumer agencies (FTC’s counterparts) are
separate entities from the Data Protection Authorities.206 In
2017, two legal articles suggesting using consumer law tools
to advance data protection goals have been welcomed as a
new and refreshing view.207 How does one explain this
surprising difference between the two systems?
American “notice and choice” model came in to fill a
normative void. In the 1990s there were no rules governing
consumer data collection online, so something was needed.
In Europe, however, there was no such void. In 1995, the year
the Internet went public, the EU adopted the Data
Protection Directive, GDPR’s predecessor, harmonizing
many of the already existing national data protection
laws.208 These national laws, in turn, were either enacted or
sustained to meet Europe’s nation states’ obligations under
international law, stemming from the Convention 108 of the
Council of Europe. So, when the Americans were discussing
what to do about internet-facilitated data collection, their

204. See Directive 2005/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices
in the Internal Market, 2005 O.J. (L149) 22.
205. One could, roughly, summarize them as a “legislatively enshrined
unconscionability doctrine.” See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95)
29.
206. These are called “Independent Supervisory Authorities” in the GDPR.
GDPR, supra note 32, ch. VI.
207. See Natali Helberger et al., The Perfect Match? A Closer Look at the
Relationship Between EU Consumer Law and Data Protection Law, 54 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1427, 1429–31 (2017); Nico van Eijk et al., Unfair Commercial
Practices: A Complementary Approach to Privacy Protection, 3 EUR. DATA
PROTECTION L. REV. 325, 325 (2017).
208. See FUSTER, supra note 108, at 55–65.
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European counterparts already had their own national data
management laws, by having just adopted new, shiny, stateof-the-art legislation to tackle the problem. These laws
contained the same catalogs of principles, rights, and
obligations as the GDPR does nowadays, and were applicable
both to public and private actors. However, they were
enacted within a human rights mindset.
Council of Europe, the body which adopted the
Convention 108, was established back in 1949, in the period
directly following the atrocities of the Second World War and
Nazism, and when the Cold War between democratic West
and communist East was materializing.209 Among its various
duties, it was tasked with the protection of human rights.210
Most notably, in the early 1950s, it adopted the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),211 followed by a series
of issue-specific international human rights treaties. Among
its many provisions, the ECHR contains Article 8: “Right to
respect for private and family life.” The article reads:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right . . . .212

For an American, this is a familiar language. The
character of this provision could be, roughly, compared to the
American Bill of Rights. Not in content, but in form. The
story goes like this: we had some really bad experience with
the government in the past, a big part of that bad experience
was the government not respecting our privacy, and so now
we put a constitutional constraint on the government to
prevent it from doing so.

209. See BIRTE WASSENBERG, HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 9–12 (2013).
210. Id.
211. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
212. Id. art. 8.
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In 1981, when (automated) information processing was
becoming widespread, human rights lawyers realized that a
qualitatively new possibility for a state to intrude in the life
of an individual emerged. Hence, the Council of Europe
adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.213 It
did so as a part of the Article 8 mandate. It read:
Article 1: The purpose of this Convention is to secure . . . for every
individual . . . respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and
in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic
processing of personal data relating to him (“data protection”). 214

What follows is a text extremely similar to the 1980
OECD guidelines and quite faithful to the 1973 Report. This
framing will make its way to the national laws of European
countries. In 1995 national laws enacted to fulfill the
obligations imposed by the Convention 108 were
harmonized,215 and in 2000 the European Union enacted its
own Charter of Fundamental Rights.216 In 2009, this Charter
became a part of the EU’s primary law (functionally the
European Union’s “Constitution”).217 Within it, one finds a
new fundamental right to “protection of personal data,”
expressed in addition to the right to privacy:

213. See Convention 108, supra note 75, art. 1.
214. Id.
215. “Harmonization of laws” is one regulatory strategy of the European
Union, occurring through an adoption of a directive. Directives are not directly
binding on individuals, but oblige the Member States to enact state-legislation
achieving the desired effect. See KAREN DAVIES, UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 56–62 (2019).
216. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 391 [hereinafter the EU Charter].
217. This statement is not entirely accurate in technical jargon, but best
manages to explain the role played by the primary law in the European Union.
For the explanation of the technical and political issues at stake when invoking
the term “constitution,” see JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE
102–07 (2001).
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1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the
right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.218

In 2016, with the right to protection of personal data
enshrined in its “Constitution,” the EU unified its data
protection law in the GPDR.219 This new law would be
noticed internationally for several reasons. First, it applies
extraterritorially, also to companies with a seat outside of
the EU, if only they direct their goods and services at the EU
residents, or monitor their behavior.220 Second, unlike its
predecessors, the GDPR gives the Data Protection
Authorities competence to fine violators up to 4% of their
yearly revenue.221 Third, the GDPR introduces several
innovations, potentially interesting for other reformers.
Those include the (in)famous right to be forgotten,222 right to
explanation,223 legislatively-mandated obligations to

218. The EU Charter, supra note 215, art. 8.
219. “Unification of laws” is another regulatory strategy of the European
Union. It occurs through an adoption of a regulation which, unlike a directive, is
directly binding on the individuals and does not require implementation by the
Member States. Regulations, Directives, and other acts, EUROPEAN UNION,
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en (last visited Mar. 17,
2020).
220. See GDPR supra note 32, art. 3, para. 2.
221. See id. art. 83.
222. See Rosen, supra note 88, at 88.
223. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained,
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 193 (2019).
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introduce “privacy by design,”224 or the institution of a “data
protection impact assessment.”225
Substantively, however, the GDPR is not a revolution,
but a subtle evolution of the system existing as binding, in
one way or the other, since 1981. The framework of general
principles, public notice mechanisms, subjects’ rights, and
controllers’ obligations existed already in the 1980 OECD
Guidelines and the Convention 108; and their contents, even
though updated and made more rigid, very much resemble
these documents. Documents which, in turn, can be traced
back to the 1973 Report. However, even though faithful to
some of the tasks it set forth, the European “personal data
protection” model also forgot some of the most important
insights of its intellectual predecessor. Just like the “notice
and choice” regime, it ended up constructing a system
focused on privacy (and data “protection”) and on individual
interests. And just like its American counterpart, it employs
technocratic means of decision-making in place of political
ones.
2. The Original Sin: Individualistic, Technocratic,
Human-Rights Mindset
Unlike the “notice and choice” model, the “personal data
protection” approach did not give in to the corporate capture
and retained several useful data management tools proposed
by the 1973 Report. First, it established a set of general
principles and processors’ obligations through legislation,
taking certain questions away from the market. Second, it
retained the separation of “fact-conferring” and “normcreating” functions of “privacy policies.” In the European
legal frame, these documents are not contracts, but rather
transparency mechanisms,226 playing a role similar to
224. See AURELIA TAMÒ-LARRIEUX, DESIGNING FOR PRIVACY AND ITS LEGAL
FRAMEWORK: DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN AND DEFAULT FOR THE INTERNET OF
THINGS 84–87 (2018).
225. GDPR supra note 32, art. 35.
226. See FREDERIK J. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION
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“nutrition facts tables” on food packaging.227 In this sense,
the GDPR does account for collective interests to a certain
degree. Just as one cannot contract-out from traffic laws
when entering a taxi, one cannot contract out from the
prohibition to profile people’s political beliefs or religious
convictions enshrined in the GDPR.228 Third, the internal
structure of the system, visible in its very name (“general”)
leaves space for further legislative interventions, tackling
certain problems issue-by-issue. However, no such
specialized laws have been enacted.
Despite some good intuitions, the GDPR commits the
same mistakes as the “notice and choice” model. It focuses on
“privacy” and “data protection,” and does not apply when
data is not-personal. Further, it concentrates on the
individual interests and individuals’ “control over their
personal data.” The notice that companies must engage in
needs to be concrete and comprehensive,229 but ultimately
should be phrased in “plain and intelligible language, easy to
understand.”230 The disclosure rules belong to the chapter on
subjects’ rights, further indicating that the individual, not
the society, is the intended recipient of these documents.
Finally, the GDPR also does not leave much space for
political decisions, replacing the market approach with
human rights, like the technocratic means of establishing
rules.
Probably the greatest omission of the European system
is a lack of a political mechanism to further specify data
IN THE AREA OF

BEHAVIOURAL TARGETING 106–09 (2015).

227. If companies lie about their data practices, they will be fined. GDPR,
supra note 32, art. 83. However, the mere fact that an individual “consents” to
what the privacy policy stipulates does not yet mean that the company is allowed
to engage in these practices. They must comply with all the other norms of the
GDPR, including purpose limitation, data minimization, etc.
228. One can consent to processing these types of data about oneself, but this
consent does not allow the company to process this type of data about other
people. See GDPR, supra note 32, art. 9.
229. See Article 29 Working Party, supra note 196, at 8–9.
230. Id.
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management rules for particular sectors. The “purpose
limitation principle” makes it unlawful to process data for
reasons other than those stipulated, but the GDPR does not
say anything about which purposes should be treated as
lawful, and which not. The questions visible in the examples
discussed in Part II: “can a company use data to price
discriminate? to engage in behavior manipulation? to
segment the society?” are not, and cannot, be answered by
the GDPR’s frame. Other legal instruments should step in.
However, no such rules have been enacted, and currently, no
such rules are pondered in the EU. Pervasively, despite
everything written about the differences of the American and
the European approach, it is the “consent” of the data
subject, given in the market conditions, that shapes the
decisions on the acceptable limits to data management. This
consent is much more difficult to obtain; the limits of what
one can consent to are much stricter.231 However, ultimately,
it will be the individual who decides to impose costs on
others. And if a data practice is questioned in a court, the
decision regarding its permissibility will be based either on
the interpretation of technocratic procedures of the GDPR
itself or on the general human rights provisions.
To be clear, I do not want this criticism to sound as if I
oppose human rights protections and human rights
movements. On the contrary, I consider them to be some of
the most important achievements of the 20th century legal
systems. However, I oppose the idea that when it comes to
Facebook’s or Google’s business models, human rights will be
the ultimate answer to what should be allowed. Obviously,
they might offer us a view on what are the boundaries that
should not be crossed; but should not be used as the source
231. One should mention, among others, the prohibition of processing of the
“special categories of data,” defined as “personal data revealing racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union
membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose
of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation.” See GDPR, supra
note 32, art. 9.
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of all normative arguments. What exactly to do with data
collection enabling behavioral manipulation or societal
segmentation are political decisions, and should be taken in
a political manner.
***
Having shown where the current legal regimes are
lacking, what socio-technological aspects escape their reach,
and how to historically explain the reasons for their
insufficiency, I would now like to sketch a proposal on how to
go about amending these legal frames.
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IV. DATA MANAGEMENT LAW FOR THE 2020S
In every jurisdiction, one can describe the contents of its
data management law. If we ask the question: what are the
rules governing the collection, analysis, and usage of data
about people; we will always get an answer. The answer
might be (and currently is): there are very few rules; most of
the decision-making is left to the market. However, there is
always some answer. In this sense, the novelty of the “data
management law” approach lies not only in the new rules it
calls for but also in the change of the mindset allowing one
to grasp this feature of the data analytics society. Some rules
always emerge, there is always someone to draft them. There
is no escape. The question is: who will draft those rules, what
form will they take, and whose interest will they protect?
I argue that in the 2020s, we should focus our efforts on
developing a data management law able to account for, and
mitigate, the social costs of data analytics. Data-driven
technologies, making our lives more efficient and more
convenient, will continue to be developed. Entities
developing them will continue to be profit-driven companies.
Someone will have to pay the costs. The authors of the 1973
report feared that those will be “some of our most
disadvantaged citizens.”232 Empirical research, for example
on data-driven discrimination, now shows this prediction
was correct.233 Moreover, we are paying costs as a society as
a whole. Some of these costs, we already see and begin to
understand, as behavior manipulation in the political
process.234 Some others, like social segmentation in the
commercial communications we receive, can be discussed
only speculatively, just as in 1973. These costs, unless we
want to ban the technology as a whole,235 cannot be entirely

232. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at vi.
233. See Sweeney, supra note 6, at 33–34.
234. See Confessore, supra note 143.
235. Which, in itself, would generate enormous social costs.
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wiped out. However, they can be channeled in a much more
conscious manner than the current regimes, the American
“notice and choice” and the European “personal data
protection,” allow us to do.
The policy recommendations of this Article could be
summarized in three claims. First, we must go beyond
“privacy” (or data “protection”) as the frame for
conceptualizing social costs of data analytics, and replace it
with a more inclusive “social costs of data management.”
This is necessary both to account for interests other than
individual privacy and to govern situations in which
individuals remain anonymous from the point of view of the
company targeting them. Second, we must account for
collective interests on top of the individual ones. The society,
not the individual, should be the addressee of disclosure
about data practices; likewise, the society, not the individual,
should have a say on the limits of these practices. The
integrity of the political process, non-discrimination or public
health, are not matters to be decided by the sum of individual
preferences. Third, these decisions are political in nature,
and so should be taken via a political process. Societal views
might differ when people are asked about the desirable limits
of behavior manipulation, or social segmentation, in the
market situations and during elections. They might differ
when the product offered on the market is clothes and when
it is pharmaceuticals. And many interests will have to be
balanced against one another. That is why we need to tackle
the social costs of data management one by one, issue by
issue; and tackle them in a political manner, on the public
forum, and not only in the offices of the technocrats.
Just like the authors of the 1973 Report, I would like to
make clear that the policy recommendations outlined below
are not meant to give us a final answer on any given datamanagement issue. Nor can they guarantee that in the end,
everyone’s interest will be accounted for and no one will have
to bear any costs. However, the envisioned paradigm will
guarantee that the decisions about these costs will be taken

2020]

DATA MANAGEMENT LAW

627

by the polity, not the by the corporations alone, and that they
will be made in a process that is as “open, informed, and
fair”236 as possible. Let us now take a look at each of the three
pillars of this new framework.
A. Beyond “Privacy”: Social Costs of Data Management
Privacy obviously matters, but achieving privacy will not
shield us from other social costs of data management.
Concentrating on privacy might make us overlook other
interests put at stake by corporate data collection and usage.
There are at least two reasons to replace the conceptual
frame of “privacy”—currently employed by the “notice and
choice” and “personal data management” regimes—with
“social costs of data management.”
First, when speaking about “privacy,” lawyers tend to
conflate two distinct social phenomena: disclosure of data
about individuals, and use of data about individuals. I argue
that the term “privacy” should be used to speak about the
former,237 while the latter should become the domain of “data
management.” The authors of the 1973 report treated these
issues jointly, following the writings of their time.238
However, both for the sake of conceptual clarity and of
effective policy-making, we should look at them separately.
Consider two examples. Imagine that I enjoy listening to
Dutch marching music on Spotify. For social reasons, I would
prefer that my colleagues, who think this is silly, do not learn
about it. At the same time, I welcome Spotify suggesting me
similar music, for example, Belgian marches. Or, imagine
that I share a photo of my face on Facebook, and accept that
everyone can see it. I am fine with my friends “sharing” it, or
Facebook “disclosing” it to all its users. At the same time, I
do not want Facebook, or anybody else, to be able to use this
236. 1973 Report, supra note 33, at 43–44.
237. This is consistent with the traditional understanding of privacy torts. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Section I.B.
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photo to develop facial-recognition technologies, and
certainly not to learn how to recognize my face. The mere fact
that I do not want my data to be disclosed does not yet mean
that I oppose using this data by a company, and the other
way round. Referring to both issues with a single term
“privacy” leads to conceptual confusion, and renders policy
discussions less nuanced.
Second, mechanisms of “privacy” and “personal data
protection” laws are triggered only when dealing with
“identified or identifiable” individuals.239 If a company knows
(or could know) that it is collecting data about my friend Bob
Smith, its actions fall within the obligations imposed by the
“notice and choice” or “personal data protection” regimes.
However, if the company takes proactive steps not to identify
him, and only collects data about his behavior and
demographics, they are not bound to respect privacy laws.240
From the point of view of someone who wants to pricediscriminate, or show some ads only to people who belong to
a certain social class, or to manipulate someone’s behavior in
the economic or the political sphere, it really does not matter
what is your name, or Social Security Number. All they need
is to assign you some (random) identification, and analyze
data about “someone” with that number, not you personally.
From the “privacy” point of view, such a world would be
wonderful. If all the personally identifiable information
“stayed” at users’ devices, and only anonymized data was
transferred, our wish for privacy would be fulfilled. However,
from the point of view of the social costs of data management,
this changes nothing. There will still exist data-driven
discrimination, exclusion, addiction, and behavioral
manipulation.

239. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 26, at 1817–18.
240. Scholars dispute whether perfect anonymization is practically feasible. I
do not offer an argument for or against that claim. Rather, I show that even if it
was, and privacy considerations were taken care of, the problem of social costs of
data management would persist.
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In the data analytics society, data-costs can be imposed
on individuals and social groups, even when the data
collected and analyzed is not private (individuals freely
disclose it) and even if the individuals are anonymous from
the point of view of the corporation using it. This is why, to
counter the social costs of data management, we need to
move beyond “privacy” and towards “data management law.”
Within it, we must identify other individual and societal
interests: decisional autonomy, paired with the integrity of
economic and political processes; freedom from addiction,
paired
with
public
health
considerations;
nondiscrimination, paired with social justice and equality; and
many more. Axiologically, those are not new problems, and
the values at stake here belong to the foundations of a liberal,
democratic society. However, the data-driven means of
intrusion upon these interests, based on seamless data
collection, inferred knowledge and automated decisionmaking call for new legal responses. These responses must
tackle the costs of data management but must occur outside
of the frame of “privacy.”
Two caveats are due. First, I am by no means claiming
that “privacy is dead,” or “not important,” or that one should
not protect it. On the contrary, I admire and support the
work of privacy advocates, and believe that we should stand
our ground regarding the privacy matters. However, as I
demonstrated, the majority of interests at stake in the data
analytics society are conceptually distinct from privacy and
can be better tackled through other channels. Second, I am
not claiming that theoretically speaking, these problems
cannot be explained and accounted for using privacy
language. Privacy is an intellectually rich field, full of finetuned arguments, distinctions, and theories.241 If one really

241. See, e.g., Lisa M. Austin, Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of
Justification, 55 MCGILL L.J. 165, 210 (2010); Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z.
Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (2018); Julie E. Cohen, What
Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Daniel J. Solove, I’ve Got Nothing
to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745
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wanted to, one probably could employ the mix of “information
privacy” and “decisional privacy” theories to tell the story of
the social costs of data management under that one label.
However, as I have shown, the stakes are too high to sacrifice
the possibility of managing all the costs at the altar of
conceptual austerity.
Once we are able to go beyond privacy when framing the
problems associated with data management, we should
concentrate on the second shortcoming of the “notice and
choice” and “personal data protection” models. And this is
focusing solely on the individual interests while remaining
blind to collective ones, and to the overall systemic health.
B. Beyond Individual Interests: “Societal Notice” and
“Societal Choices”
Current data management laws value individual
interests higher than collective ones. In a way, they are
created solely to protect individual interests. The American
“notice and choice” model concentrates on the individual
consumer expressing her market preferences, while the
European “personal data protection” model exists to protect
the human rights of an individual data subject. However,
given the potential for externalities, and the fact that one
person’s disclosure imposes data-driven costs on other
people, individuals should not be the only decision-makers.
Certain collective interests, or interests of certain minorities,
can only be protected as a result of collective action.
In both systems, an individual is the intended recipient
of the disclosure (occurring through the “privacy policies”)
and the ultimate decision-makers (acting through “choice” or
“consent”). I argue that these two elements of the data
management laws should be modified.
Let us begin with disclosure. The 1973 Report called for
legislatively mandated “public notice,” aimed at facilitating
political deliberations. Forty-five years later, in a world in
(2007).
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which we failed to live up to the tasks set forth in the report,
Shoshana Zuboff observed: “Surveillance capitalists know
everything about us whereas their operations are designed
to be unknowable to us.”242 Currently existing “privacy
policies” not only are written in a language difficult to
understand243 but often simply do not contain the
information necessary to fully comprehend corporations’
operations.244 Usage of open-ended phrases like “including,”
“among others”; conditional forms like “we might,” or vague
terms like “business partners,” “research purposes” have
been documented by researchers245 and criticized by
experts.246 Hence, the reasons why so few people fully
understand what companies do with personal data pertain
not only to the limitations of humans 247 but also the fact that
the information often simply is not there. To be fair to the
companies, there are good legal reasons for vagueness. If a
policy must be understandable to the individual, one cannot
expect a company to produce a 100-page long document
containing a comprehensive list of all the business partners,
types of uses and categories of data. Arguably, the
requirements
of
“comprehensiveness”
and
“comprehensibility” cannot be fully reconciled.
For these reasons, data management law for the 2020s
should change the recipient of disclosure from an individual
consumer (or data subject) to the community as a whole.248
We should require that companies collecting, analyzing, and
using data disclose the identity of all the corporations that
242. See ZUBOFF, supra note 59, at 11.
243. See Reidenberg, supra note 186, at 39, 51.
244. See Contissa, supra note 189.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party, supra note 196, at 6–7.
247. See Solove, supra note 188, at 1880.
248. This would also include the active regulators, should they be established
by law. For the arguments supporting this type of disclosure, see Rory Van Loo,
The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance,
72 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (2019).
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they share data with (or receive data from), all types of data
they analyze, and all uses to which they put it. For the
disclosure to be meaningful, these “notices” should be
absolutely concrete and comprehensive. We should forbid the
usage of open-ended (“including . . .”) and conditional (“may”)
phrases and require concrete examples and descriptions of
all the general terms, like “personalized advertising” or
“improving services.” What types of goals are pursued? What
types of improvements envisioned? This should be concretely
specified. Other transparency mechanisms could be
introduced as well. For example, one could ponder the
creation of a national registry of data brokers (which already
exists on the state level in Vermont)249 and the national
repository of data sales and licensing contracts (similar to
the repository managed by the SEC).250
One could argue against these types of disclosure
obligations, claiming that they would generate “too much
data to process.” If every company was supposed to
concretely describe all their data practices, would these
documents not end up being hundreds of pages long each?
This is a legitimate, but an unfounded, worry. Yes, these
documents could be extremely long. However, we need to
remember that when the corporations encountered this
problem, they developed new data analytics technologies.
There is no reason for the public not to use similar tools.
Researchers have shown that techniques like machine
learning, including natural language processing, can be
employed to empower civil society by increasing their data
processing capacities.251 Just like Google or Facebook equip
249. See Douglas MacMillan, Data Brokers Are Selling Your Secrets. How
States Are Trying to Stop Them, WASH. POST (June 24, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/06/24/data-brokers-are-gettingrich-by-selling-your-secrets-how-states-are-trying-stop-them/.
250. See James A. Overdahl, A Researcher’s Guide to the Contracts of Firms
Filing with the SEC, 34 J.L. & ECON. 695, 695–99 (1991).
251. See Marco Lippi et al., CLAUDETTE: An Automated Detector of
Potentially Unfair Clauses in Online Terms of Service, 27 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 117, 117–18, 135–36 (2019).
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their human employees with powerful data analytics
technologies; activists, journalists, and public authorities
could increase the factual capabilities of lawyers working for
them with the usage of the same techniques.252
This would also separate the fact-conferring function of
“privacy notices” from the norm-creating one. Another
objection one raises against increasing the requirements for
concreteness and comprehensiveness of these documents has
to do with corporations’ mixed incentives. If companies can
only do what they state in the privacy policy, and the privacy
policy must list all the business partners and all purposes of
using data, etc., would that not stifle innovation, or
incentivize companies who want to innovate not to disclose?
This worry holds only within the current paradigm of “notice
and choice,” where the “privacy policy” is, at the same time,
a disclosure mechanism and the contract. However, under
the data management law, these two would be separate. The
norms governing what data uses are acceptable would be
enshrined in legislation, and if the companies would like to
conclude additional boilerplate contracts, these contracts
would be different documents that the “public notices.”
The purpose of these legislatively mandated disclosures
would be to increase to social scrutiny of data practices and
to enable political decisions about the necessary rules.
Further, they would enable proper oversight and
enforcement of these rules. These rules, in turn, should stem
not from technocratic means like the operation of the
markets, or human rights adjudication, but from political
choices made by society. What would that look like?
C. Beyond Technocracy: On the Necessity of Politics
Data management aimed at minimizing and allocating
social costs of personal data processing necessarily entails
choices. The question is: who should take them, how should
252. Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 87, 102
(2014).
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they be taken, and based on what normative considerations.
Having argued for transferring these choices from the
individual to the collective sphere, I would now like to outline
how this should occur in a sectorial, issue-by-issue basis; how
the normative considerations should be political and not
technocratic; and present some deliberative and regulatory
strategies for the legal reformer.
1. Against One-Size-Fits-All, and for Sectorial Solutions

The authors of the 1973 Report argued against one,
overarching system of managing all social costs of data
analytics, writing:
The number and variety of institutions using automated personal
data systems is enormous. Systems themselves vary greatly in
purpose, complexity, scope of application, and administrative
context.253

However, both the “notice and choice” and the “personal
data protection” regimes ended up instituting one-size-fitsall solutions. Even if American privacy law can be called
“sectoral,” the “notice and choice model” is, in itself, a onesize-fits-all regime. Every instance of data collection,
analysis, and usage occurring in the online commercial
context is governed by corporate self-regulation and market
transactions. It does not matter whether the question
concerns using my shopping history to show me
recommendations of other products, using information about
me to infer knowledge about others, or using that inferred
knowledge to price discriminate or manipulate their
behavior. The decision always occurs in the form of a
boilerplate contract. Similarly, the European “personal data
protection” regime applies exactly the same set of principles,
rights, and obligations to all situations. A pizzeria keeping
my phone number to text me promo codes, and online
advertisers trying to convince people to vote “yes” in Brexit
referendum based on data I have disclosed, are governed by

253. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 43.
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the same law. As if the stakes were the same, and the societal
choices identical.
To address the social costs of data management, we
should return to the approach suggested by the 1973 report,
and practiced in the US until the late 1990s, i.e. sectoral
legislation. In the data management law for the 2020s, we
should remain faithful to the practice of addressing various
types of data-driven costs one by one. Legislative
deliberations regarding behavioral, targeted advertising;
addictive design employed by social media, or price
discrimination are long overdue. And the outcomes of these
deliberations, both regarding the questions of whether to
regulate, and how to regulate, need not, and should not, be
always the same. A statute governing price discrimination in
consumer products like clothes needs not to employ the same
rules as a statute governing price discrimination in
pharmaceuticals. The principles used in these laws need not
be the same as the principles used to counter behavior
manipulation in consumer markets. Which, in turn, need not
be identical to those aimed at preventing behavior
manipulation in the political sphere. Prevention of datadriven social-media addiction can be achieved using different
channels than non-discrimination in job advertisements.
Note that in some spheres we might even accept the
normative frames enshrined in the existing approaches. For
example, when data analytics in criminal law are concerned,
human rights is probably the correct standard to apply.
Similarly, in some market conditions, where the potential for
social costs is low, we might be fine with leaving some
decisions to the market. However, none of these two should
be the single standard aimed at solving all the problems; and
the question what standard to employ where is, in essence, a
political one.
2. Bring the Questions to the Public Debate

As a society we allow individuals to engage in activities
that might impose costs on others. Sometimes, we are willing
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to accept very high costs. In his seminal The Decision for
Accidents, Guido Calabresi pointed out that we allow car
traffic, despite the fact that, statistically speaking, we know
how many Americans will lose life on the road this year.254 If
we really believed that human life is priceless, we would
simply outlaw cars, and accept the world with lower mobility
and higher prices of goods. We are not willing to pay such a
price.
If this is the case with matters of life and death, one can
easily assume that also in data analytics society, where
autonomy, equal treatment and mental well-being of some
individuals are at stake, we will choose to pay that price in
exchange for the benefits of increased efficiency, new
possibilities, and convenience. As of today, these “choices”
are made by the markets in the US, and by human rights
experts (at least in theory) in the EU. However, they should
be up to debate.
Consider price-discrimination. As explained in Part II,
ubiquitous data-driven price discrimination can lead to
increased efficiency, but also to social segmentation. The
choice we face is not whether to allow it or prohibit it, but
rather what social costs of allowing it are we willing to
tolerate. Imagine, for example, that personalized price
discrimination leads to a world where the consumers earning
three-digit salaries have to, on average, pay 50% more for the
plane tickets than those earning less than 60,000. Whether
this should be acceptable or not is a policy decision that we
should take as a society; not a random effect of allowing, or
applying a general prohibition on, analyzing shoppinghistory data. We might be willing to accept price
discrimination if it traces wealth, or when it traces
preferences,255 but oppose it when leading to social
segmentation, even if the price is lower efficiency.

254. Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1965).
255. See Bar-Gill, supra note 3.

2020]

DATA MANAGEMENT LAW

637

Or think about targeted advertising. As a society, we
might be willing to accept some level of data-driven behavior
manipulation in some consumer markets, but oppose them
in the political sphere. Or, we might be willing or accept it in
the political sphere, provided that all sides have access to the
same technology. Further, when issues like discrimination in
ad-delivery are concerned, we might want to prohibit it
altogether or try to come up with some mitigating
mechanisms. Instead, what we see today, is economists
discussing what is more efficient, or human rights lawyers
debating what respects human dignity, without giving much
say to the people regarding the type of world they would like
to live in.
One caveat: I am not, by any means, arguing against the
involvement of experts in the law-making process.
Participation of people understanding the intricacies of
technology, of the human mind, and of the functioning of the
market, is necessary both at the problem-positing and
solution-implementing stage. However, what I do argue
against is leaving the normative choices, the political choices,
to the experts only. It should not be the case that what is
acceptable in Facebook’s or Google’s business model will be
decided by an economist applying some theory of efficiency,
or a human rights lawyers subscribing to some theory of
privacy. Those are choices to be left to the people. This is the
last “latent effect” identified by the authors of the 1973
report: “questions of record-keeping practice which involve
issues of social policy are sometimes treated as if they were
nothing more than questions of efficient technique.”256 It is
time to re-gain them for politics.
How exactly should we do it? Again, the answer will
differ depending on the issue. Certain matters, like the
integrity of the political process or non-discrimination, could
and should be fought for, and discussed, by various civil
society groups representing the interests of the people. Other
256. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 23.
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matters, like whether to allow business models where the
service is “free,” but comes with a cost of data collection and
usage, should be expressly posed to the people. Become a part
of the political process. Part of the political candidates’
platforms. Let us see what is it that people want. As of today,
the market gives us just the illusion of choice.
3. Direct and Indirect Data Management Law
The last observation I would like to share pertains to the
object of potential regulatory intervention. Data
management laws can govern either data-practices
themselves, like collection, analysis, sharing and usage of
personal data; or the data-driven practices themselves, like
behavioral advertising, price discrimination or online service
provisions. There is a dialectical relationship between the
two, where putting limits on data practices can tame the
social costs of other practices; while regulating these
practices can minimize the collection of data in the first
place. Consider two examples.
First, one could imagine legislation largely limiting the
possibility of price-discrimination online. For example, it
could contain a straightforward prohibition of charging
different consumers different prices. Such a law would not
address the practices of data collection and usage explicitly
but minimize the incentive to collect and analyze data by
some companies. If the effects cannot be used to price
discriminate, why bother to collect and analyze data in the
first place.
On the other hand, it is possible to address the problem
of data usage and collection to tackle social costs directly. For
example, there could be norm prohibiting using data on
consumer behavior to target political communications. As a
result, even without passing a law on limits of political
speech, an intervention aimed at data practices would bring
about changes in the creation and distribution of social costs.
Whether to employ one way of intervening or the other,
again, is a matter for political choice.
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CONCLUSION
This Article argued for a new way of thinking about the
negative effects of data analytics: data management law.
Instead of concentrating solely on privacy (or data
“protection”) I suggested we should adopt a more inclusive
category of “social costs of data management.” Instead of
focusing on individual interest only, we should account for
the collective ones as well. And instead of employing onesize-fits-all technocratic solutions, like markets or human
rights, we should adopt a more nuanced, issue-by-issue,
political approach to setting the limits on data practices.
Human rights might delineate the boundaries of what we can
allow, but a huge space for political deliberation remains
within those boundaries. The question: what society do we
want to live in? can be answered in numerous, equally
legitimate, ways. Markets might be a useful tool for
achieving some of our goals, but they should function within
politically agreed upon legal frames.
The history of the “notice and choice” and “personal data
protection” approaches teaches us several valuable lessons.
The problems we face today are not new. Already in 1973,
the authors of the HEW Report foresaw the world
characterized by the easy access to data about people;
corporate ability to use this data for many purposes,
including to influence human behavior; and the risk of
imposing the costs of data-driven practices on the most
vulnerable members of the society. The development of the
legal response to these threats in the United States has been
halted by the liberal euphoria of the 1990s, while its
European counterpart has been overshadowed by the human
rights mindset of “data protection.” However, at the dawn of
the 2020s, we see how the markets neither accounted for, nor
properly distributed, the social costs of data management.
We see how human rights cannot be the only normative
criterion in debating the limits of data management. We
must see that it is time to move on.
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Whatever the path we ultimately take, three
observations will remain true. First, in the data analytics
society, a person disclosing personal information imposes
costs on other people, by enabling companies to infer new
knowledge about others. Second, these costs can be imposed
on people without personally identifying them, thus without
violating their “privacy.” This is how technology functions
and can function. The question is whether this should be
permissible. Which leads me to the final observation: there
is always a political decision taken. Regardless of whether it
occurs explicitly through legislation, or implicitly, by leaving
the decision to the market, and allowing corporations to
write their own rules, some decision occurs. We know what
the rules written by the corporations are. Hence, it is up to
us to decide. Will the substance of the data management law
result from our political action, or our failure to act?

